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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1962 decision of Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,1 the United
States Supreme Court reviewed a district court's sua sponte dismissal
of a diversity negligence action. Six years after the plaintiff filed the
matter, the district court scheduled a pretrial conference and gave
counsel two weeks notice of the scheduled conference. On the day of
the conference, plaintiffs counsel called the court to say that he would
be unable to attend the conference, giving the impolitic reason that he
was busy preparing some documents for the state supreme court. The
attorney did not attend the conference, and the district court dis-
missed the matter for failure to appear and prosecute the claim. In
reviewing the district court dismissal, the Supreme Court stated the
following:
There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner's
claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty
on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative
in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omis-
sions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsis-
tent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is
deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have "no-
tice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney." 2
When discussing the attorney-client relationship, the legal commu-
nity and society at large commonly refer to attorneys as "represent-
ing" clients. Such statements informally recognize the formal
relationship lawyers and clients have as agents and principals. There
1. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
2. Id. at 633-34 (quoting Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879)).
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is no disagreement on this basic premise. 3 In the usual and custom-
ary manner of legal reasoning, identifying lawyers as the agents of
their client-principals invokes the established body of agency law that
has developed from-and applies to-other agent-principal relation-
ships. This body of law generally leads to the result reached by the
Supreme Court in Link: that the client is responsible for the attorney's
actions in the context of the representation.
Yet, some modern courts have not found the client responsible for
the attorney's actions. These courts do not treat the attorney-client
relationship as they do other agent-principal relationships. For exam-
ple, courts often do not apply the standard agency concepts in address-
ing whether the client should be responsible for the attorney's tortious
actions. Likewise, courts often do not apply standard agency doctrine,
or they do so very conservatively, when the question is whether a set-
tlement agreed to by the attorney binds the client. Finally, some
courts seem to apply a modified agency doctrine to the question of
whether an attorney has waived the attorney-client privilege. In each
of these settings, courts disregard traditional agency principles,
breaking the link between client and attorney and insulating the cli-
ent from responsibility for the attorney's actions.
These contexts may not be the only ones in which agency principles
are given cramped application when the agent and principal are an
attorney and a client.4 These examples are, however, significant be-
cause each setting involves important countervailing interests. The
interest of an innocent third party is at issue in the tort scenario. In
the settlement context, the interest of the innocent third party as well
as the systemic interest in encouraging settlements are both at play.
Further, in the attorney-client privilege setting, the systemic interest
3. See, e.g., Wentland v. Wass, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("'The
relationship of attorney and client is one of agent and principal."' (quoting Shafer
v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d
777, 788 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003))); Daniel v. Moore, 596 S.E.2d 465, 469 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004), affd, 606 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. 2004) ("'North Carolina law has long rec-
ognized that an attorney-client relationship is based upon principles of agency.'"
(quoting Johnson v. Amethyst Corp., 463 S.E.2d 397, 400 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)));
McBurney v. Roszkowski, 875 A.2d 428, 437 (R.I. 2005) ("'The relationship [be-
tween an attorney and client] is essentially one of principal and agent."' (quoting
State v. Cline, 405 A.2d 1192, 1199 (R.I. 1979))). See also discussion infra section
II.A.
4. For example, courts may not be dealing with lawyers' procedural errors as tradi-
tional agency law would dictate. See, e.g., Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co., 795 F.2d
1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("We look disfavorably upon dismissals as sanctions
for attorney misconduct or delay unless the client himself has been made aware
of the problem, usually through notice from the trial court." (emphasis omitted)).
See also William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client Re-
lationship: An Improper Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for Their
Attorneys' Procedural Errors, 1988 DuKE L.J. 733, 737-39 (1988) (discussing the
procedural error setting).
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in favor of disclosure of relevant information is present. One'would
expect courts to protect these countervailing interests. Yet, courts re-
peatedly sacrifice these interests along with agency principles in order
to reach a result that protects the client.
Courts' reluctance to apply agency doctrine in the traditional man-
ner appears to be motivated by a desire either to limit-or to eliminate
entirely-a client's responsibility for an attorney's actions. The mini-
mization of client responsibility is not an unintended consequence.
The courts seemingly seek to protect clients from their own lawyers'
actions-even at the expense of innocent third parties and the judicial
system. While courts may be acting with great intentions, such spe-
cial treatment for clients is misguided. The attorney-client relation-
ship needs no special rules that apply only to it. The client neither
needs nor deserves special protection. The wronged client has the pro-
tection of both the attorney discipline system and a malpractice ac-
tion. One must also recognize that clients in today's legal services
market are often sophisticated users of legal services and in control
not only of global decisions relating to the representation, but also of
more instrumental or ministerial decisions. These clients should be
held accountable for their agent's actions. There is no unfairness in
doing so.
One must question the propriety of the balance struck by these
courts in the situation of lawyer-agents and client-principals when the
balance is different for other agent-principal situations. Agency law
has developed so as to strike the proper balance between the interests
of the principal, the interests of the agent, and the interests of third
parties such as the judicial system or other individuals dealing with
the agent. Protecting client interests by making the client less respon-
sible for the attorney's actions no doubt protects the client's specific
interest in the short run. In the long run, however, such a stance pro-
vides little incentive for client monitoring of attorney conduct and
fewer consequences for substandard lawyer conduct. In addition, at
least in the tort scenario, the court's current treatment of the lawyer-
client relationship provides no encouragement for the client to urge
the lawyer to pursue goals properly. In all settings, special rules pro-
tecting clients provide much room for mendacious and inappropriate
client behavior. This protection of the client seems especially odd in
light of the fact that attorneys are fiduciaries, and, unlike many other
types of agents, are governed by a code of ethical conduct apart from
the general duties of an agent.
In addition to the specific effects created by treating the attorney-
client relationship differently from other agent-principal relation-
ships, this special treatment creates great confusion in terms of the
law that should apply to the attorney-client relationship in general.
Attorneys are declared to be agents, and clients are declared to be
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principals, but general agency principles may or may not apply to
them. Additionally, the general law of agency becomes less clear as
the cases involving attorneys are factored into the total body of agency
law. Those doing the factoring may be unaware that a rule may be
different for attorney-agents and client-principals than it would be for
other agency relationships.
This Article begins with a discussion of the relevant agency law
concepts. The Article then analyzes three situations to develop an un-
derstanding of how traditional agency doctrine might apply and to de-
velop an understanding of how some courts diverge from traditional
agency in specific situations. First, the Article examines the treat-
ment of client liability for an attorney's tortious acts when those acts
are closely related to the representation. Second, the treatment of cli-
ent responsibility for settlements agreed to by the client's attorney
will be explored. Third, the treatment of attorneys unilaterally waiv-
ing the client's attorney-client privilege will be evaluated. Finally,
this Article concludes that special rules of agency for the attorney-cli-
ent relationship adopted to protect the client are unnecessary, have
significant negative consequences, and should be abandoned.
II. AGENCY CONCEPTS AS APPLIED TO ATTORNEYS
A. The Nature of Agency
Agency is "the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person
(a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an 'agent') that the
agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents to so
act."5 Attorneys are agents. 6 The client retains the attorney to han-
dle a matter and gives the attorney some degree of direction about the
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)"].
6. "Legal representation saves the client's time and effort and enables legal work to
be delegated to an expert. Lawyers therefore are recognized as agents for their
clients in litigation and other legal matters." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 26 cmt. b (2000) [hereinafter "RLGL"]. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N cmt. a (1958) (attorneys are agents and inde-
pendent contractors) [hereinafter "RESTATEMENT (SECOND)"]. See generally
WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 21 (3d ed. 2001)
(attorneys are agents); James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Char-
acterization "Officer of the Court," 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 399-401 (2000) (histori-
cally agency law was the core of the lawyers' role); Deborah A. DeMott, A Revised
Prospectus for a Third Restatement of Agency, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1035, 1037
(1998) (stating that lawyer-client relationships are agency relationships);
Deborah A. DeMott, The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 301 (1998)
(maintaining that "the lawyer-client relationship is a commonsensical illustra-
tion of agency"); Arnold I. Siegel, Abandoning the Agency Model of the Lawyer-
Client Relationship: A New Approach for Deciding Authority Disputes, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 473, 476 (1990) (stating that attorneys are agents); Paul R. Tremblay, On
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2007] CLIENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYER CONDUCT 351
matter. With regard to litigation, the client's instructions may be very
general. For instance, the client may simply state that the attorney
should seek to minimize the financial damage for the client. Alterna-
tively, the client's instructions could be very specific, with the client
directing the attorney on most, if not all, actions in the litigation. The
engagement of the attorney, along with a client's instructions, creates
the principal and agent relationship, assuming that the attorney
agrees to act as the client's agent when requested to do so by the
client.
Notably, the principal may terminate the agency even if the princi-
pal has agreed not to do so. 7 In the context of attorney and client, the
courts always have valued the right of the client to end the relation-
ship.8 This right recognizes the sanctity of the attorney-client rela-
tionship in that the client can terminate the relationship whenever
the client loses faith in the attorney. A client who loses faith in his or
her attorney cannot have the trust and confidence in that attorney
necessary for a properly working attorney-client relationship. Thus,
the client cannot be forced to be represented by a particular attorney. 9
B. Types of Agents
Historically, the category of agents has been divided into two sub-
categories on the basis of the type of control the principal has over the
agent. If the principal has the right to control the physical attributes
of the agent's actions, the agent has been viewed as a servant1 0 agent
Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Com-
petent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515, 515 (1987) (same).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 3.10(1); RLGL, supra note 6, § 31 cmt.
b; id. at § 32(1). See also GREGORY, supra note 6, § 47, at 110 (stating that "au-
thority as commonly conceived in an agency setting may always be revoked").
8. See Martin v. Camp, 114 N.E. 46 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that the client can termi-
nate the attorney and reasoning that the rule was "calculated to promote public
confidence in the members of an honorable profession whose relation to their cli-
ents is personal and confidential"). See also Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Law-
yers' Contracts is Different, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 443, 458 (1998) (discussing the
rule that gives the client the right to discharge the attorney for any reason).
9. See Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Under New York law, an
attorney may be dismissed by a client at any time with or without cause."); Avery
v. Manitowoc County, 428 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (E.D. Wis. 2006) ("The rule is
based on the idea that the client-lawyer relationship is not commercial in nature
but one whose essential features are trust and confidence, such that a client
should not be forced to rely on a lawyer if he no longer wishes to do so."); Kreiz-
inger v. Schlesinger, 925 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) ("The lawyer-
client relationship is an 'at will' contract because a client has a right to discharge
a lawyer at any time, with or without cause."); Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman v.
Protopapas, 890 A.2d 1022, 1028 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) ("[Tlhere is
virtually no limitation on a client's ability to terminate the relationship.").
10. "A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is
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and the principal has been referred to as the master.1 1 If the principal
does not have the right to control the physical attributes of the agent's
actions, the agent has been labeled as an independent contractor.12
Not all independent contractors are agents, but if a party has been
authorized to act for a principal, and if the principal does not have the
ability to control the physical actions of the authorized party, the
party is an independent contractor and also an agent of the principal.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency ("Restatement (Second)") states:
"'[I]ndependent contractor' is a term which is antithetical to the word
'servant,' although not to the word 'agent.'"13
Attorneys generally have been viewed as independent contractor
agents. Clients do not control the physical actions of attorneys, but
they do authorize attorneys to act for them. Thus, attorneys are not
servants, but agents. The Restatement (Second) specifically notes that
attorneys are independent contractors and also agents. 1
4
The Restatement (Third) of Agency ("Restatement (Third)") no
longer uses the terms "independent contractor," "servant," or
"master." Rather, the Restatement (Third) uses the terms "employer"
and "employee" for the anachronistic terms, "master" and "servant."'15
The Restatement (Third) also abandons the term "independent con-
subject to the other's control or right to control." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 6, § 220(1).
11. Id. § 2 (defining master, servant, and independent contractor).
12. See id. § 14N ("One who contracts to act on behalf of another and subject to the
other's control except with respect to his physical conduct is an agent and also an
independent contractor."). See also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 336
(2001) (discussing tort liability of independent contractors); GREGORY, supra note
6, § 7, at 18-19 (discussing various classifications of agents).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 14N cmt. a (1958). See also United
States. v. Thomas, 377 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2004) (financial advisor is indepen-
dent contractor but this role would not preclude him from also being an agent);
Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 10 P.3d 625, 628 (Ariz. 2000) (independent contractors
can be agents); Stoll v. Noel, 694 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1997) (physicians were
independent contractors and also agents of the hospital); Bonk v. McPherson, 605
A.2d 74, 78 (Me. 1992) (independent contractors can be agents); Robles v. Consoli-
dated Graphics, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (even if the plain-
tiff was an independent contractor, he could also be and was an agent);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 2(3) (stating that the independent con-
tractor "may or may not be an agent").
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 14N cmt. a (1958) ("[A]ttorneys
are independent contractors since they are contractors but, although employed to
perform services, are not subject to the control or right to control of the principal
with respect to their physical conduct in the performance of the services. How-
ever .... they fall within the category of agents."). See also GREGORY, supra note
6, § 7, at 19 (Attorneys are independent contractors who are agents. Examples of
independent contractors who are nonagents include building contractors, buyers,
and sellers.); Cohen, supra note 6 (stating attorneys are agent independent
contractors).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, Introduction.
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tractor" because of the substantial confusion and lack of clarity sur-
rounding its use.16 The Restatement (Third) does not have a
substitute term for "independent contractor," but it deals with these
issues in terms of nonservant agents, servant agents, and individuals
who are not agents at all. 1 7 Many courts, undoubtedly, will continue
to use the older language.18
Agents have also been categorized according to the scope of their
agency. "A general agent is authorized to conduct a series of transac-
tions involving a continuity of service." 19 Most general agents are
"managers, sales clerks and persons of that type."2 0 A special agent is
one "authorized to conduct a single transaction or a series of transac-
tions not involving continuity of service."2 1 While any particular at-
torney could be a special or general agent depending on the
relationship with the client, typically courts have viewed attorneys as
special agents. 2 2
C. Actual and Apparent Authority
A principal is bound by the actions of the agent if the agent has
actual or apparent authority to take the action.23 Actual authority
can be express or implied and requires that the principal, by words or
conduct "reasonably believe[d]" by the agent, causes the agent to be-
16. See id. § 1.01 cmt. c. "[T]he common term 'independent contractor' is equivocal in
meaning and confusing in usage because some of those labeled independent con-
tractors are agents while others are nonagent service providers. The antonym of
'independent contractor' is also equivocal because one who is not an independent
contractor may be an employee or a nonagent service provider." Id.
17. See id.
18. Because the terms "master," "servant," and "independent contractor" have been
the accepted terms of art for decades, a discussion of applicable rules and court
use of those rules must include the terms used by the courts. For clarification,
however, and for easy understanding in light of the Restatement (Third), this ar-
ticle refers to "master employer," "servant employee," and "independent
contractor."
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 3(1).
20. Id. § 3 cmt. c.
21. Id. § 3(2). See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. World Wide Licensing Corp., 898 P.2d
347, 352 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (citing the Restatement (Second)). See generally
GREGORY, supra note 6, § 7, at 18-19 (discussing the special and general
distinction).
22. See, e.g., Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark v. Pugh, 686 So. 2d 281, 283 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1996) (attorney is a special agent during the prosecution or defense of his
client's case); Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1305 (Ind. 1998)
(attorney employed to handle only workers compensation claim is a special
agent); State ex rel. Montgomery v. Goldstein, 220 P. 565, 567 (Or. 1923) (An
attorney is a special agent.).
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, §§ 2.01-03 (defining "authority" and
.apparent authority"); See generally GREGORY, supra note 6, § 14.
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lieve that the agent is authorized to take action. 2 4 A principal can,
orally or in writing, ask or direct the agent to take action on the prin-
cipal's behalf. This express authority can be very general or very spe-
cific. The principal can also imply to the agent that the agent has
authority to take action on the principal's behalf. Generally, this re-
quires evidence that, although the principal did not expressly state
that the agent had authority, the principal manifested an intention
that the agent have that authority. 25 The Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers ("RLGL") states that the lawyer's act will be
considered to be the client's act if "the client has expressly or impliedly
authorized the act," if the client ratifies the act, or if the act is reason-
ably believed by the lawyer to be required by law or by a tribunal.
26
A principal can also be bound by the actions of the agent vis-a-vis
the third party if the agent acts with apparent authority. 27 Apparent
authority exists if the principal's acts or words in the circumstances-
not the agent's acts or words-create a reasonable belief in the third
party dealing with the agent that the agent is authorized to take the
action on behalf of the principal. 28 Notably, however, if the agent does
not have actual authority to act on behalf of the principal, the princi-
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2.01 (Actual authority is created when
the agent "reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestation
to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent to act.").
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2.01 cmt. b. See also Stevens v. Frost,
32 A.2d 164, 168-69 (Me. 1943) ("Implied authority is actual authority circum-
stantially proven from the facts and circumstances attending the transaction in
question and includes such incidental authority as is necessary, usual and proper
as a means of effectuating the purpose of the employment ... .
26. See RLGL, supra, note 6, § 26(1).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2.03 (defining "apparent authority").
The Restatement (Second) provides for "inherent agency power" as an alternative
to actual or apparent authority. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 8A.
This concept has neither been widely used nor widely understood. The Restate-
ment (Third) abandons it on the theory that it is covered by other concepts. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, ch. 2, Introductory note; id. § 1.03, Re-
porter's Note a.
28. The Restatement (Third) states: "Apparent authority is the power held by an
agent or other actor to affect a principal's legal relations with third parties when
as third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the
principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations." RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2.03. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
6, § 8 (defining "apparent authority"). See also Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of
Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1121 (1st Cir. 1993) ("It is a 'fundamental rule that appar-
ent authority cannot be established by the putative agent's own words or conduct,
but only by the principal.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927
F.2d 1259, 1269 (1st Cir. 1991))); Bolus v. United Penn Bank, 525 A.2d 1215,
1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) ("The third party is entitled to believe the agent has
the authority he purports to exercise only where a person of ordinary prudence,
diligence and discretion would so believe. Thus, a third party can rely on the
apparent authority of an agent when this is a reasonable interpretation of the
manifestations of the principal."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5,
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pal may pursue the agent for recompense for acting without
authority.2 9
In evaluating the existence of apparent authority, courts consider
the prior dealings between the principal and the third party. By al-
lowing the agent to take certain actions, the principal communicates
to third parties that the agent may have the authority to act similarly
in the future.3 0 Courts often perform a "positional" analysis of appar-
ent authority. If a principal places the agent in a position that cus-
tomarily has certain authority, then a third party is reasonable in
concluding that the agent in the position has such authority. So, if a
principal bestows upon the agent the title of "Vice President of Human
Relations," a third party would be justified in concluding that the
agent has authority customarily given to holders of such a position. 3 1
The RLGL specifically recognizes the possibility of apparent au-
thority in the attorney-client setting by stating that the client is re-
sponsible for the acts of the lawyer if "the tribunal or [a] third person
reasonably assumes that the lawyer is authorized to do the act on the
basis of the client's (and not the lawyer's) manifestations of such au-
thorization."32 A client is responsible for a lawyer's statements if the
statements are made with actual authority or if the statements con-
cern "a matter within the scope of the representation and [are] made
by the lawyer during it." 3 3
A court easily could conclude that an attorney's actions constitut-
ing the tort of abuse of process, for example, are within the attorney's
§ 3.03 (discussing creation of apparent authority). See generally GREGORY, supra
note 6, § 23, at 64-72 (discussing apparent authority).
29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 8.09(1) ("An agent has a duty to take
action only within the scope of the agent's actual authority."). See also id. cmt. b
("If an agent takes action beyond the scope of the agent's actual authority, the
agent is subject to liability to the principal for loss caused the principal."); John-
son v. Tesky, 643 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) ("The practical difference
between actual and apparent settlement authority is that, while in both in-
stances the client is bound, in the latter case he may seek a remedy against his
attorney for breach of contract.").
30. See Earl v. St. Louis Univ., 875 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("The princi-
pal may .. .create the appearance of authority by prior acts."). See also Bills v.
Wardsboro Sch. Dist., 554 A.2d 673, 675 (Vt. 1988) ("The existence of an agency
relationship does not depend on the label the parties gave it, but may be demon-
strated from the circumstances of the particular situation or the conduct of the
parties.").
31. See Earl v. St. Louis Univ., 875 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("If a princi-
pal allows an agent to occupy a position which, according to the ordinary habits of
people in the locality, trade or profession, carries a particular kind of authority,
then anyone dealing with the agent is justified in inferring that the agent has
such authority."). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 3.03 cmts. b, c,
d, & e (discussing ways of creating apparent authority regarding position).
32. RLGL, supra note 6, § 27 (2000).
33. Id. § 28(3)(b) (2000).
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actual or apparent authority in representing the client. Likewise, a
court could conclude that an attorney acted with actual or apparent
authority when accepting a settlement offer or waiving the attorney-
client privilege.
D. Tort Responsibility
A client's tort responsibility for an attorney's actions will likely de-
pend on the relationship deemed to exist between the parties. Gener-
ally speaking, the doctrine of respondeat superior 3 4 does not apply
because attorneys are unlikely to be deemed servant-employees of
their clients. 3 5 As noted earlier, attorneys are generally viewed as in-
dependent contractors-not servants-because clients do not have
physical control over attorneys' actions. Since attorneys are indepen-
dent contractors, respondeat superior liability does not apply.3 6 Thus,
it becomes important to determine whether the attorney has dual sta-
tus as an agent of the client.
Historically, the law imposed no tort liability on a principal for the
physical harm caused by the actions of a nonagent independent con-
tractor. 3 7 This rule has gathered some exceptions through the years,
34. The Restatement (Third) notes that respondeat superior is closely related to tort
law but is generally thought of as an agency doctrine. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 5, § 2.04 cmt. b. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2.04
("An employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting
within the scope of their employment."). Accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 6, § 2 cmt. a (a master is liable for physical harm caused to third persons by
the tort of the servant within the scope of the employment). See also GREGORY,
supra note 6, § 52, at 117-123 (discussing respondeat superior). This is true even
for intentional torts. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 505 (5th ed. 1984). See generally DOBBS, supra note 12,
§ 334 (discussing the rationale of respondeat superior); id. § 335 (discussing re-
spondeat superior as applied to servants); Fowler V. Harper, The Basis of the
Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494 (1934)
(discussing the rationale for and origin of respondeat superior).
35. One example of a servant employee is a driver who is taking supplies for his
employer to another location. The driver's employer will be responsible to any
third party injured by the driver's negligent conduct in driving the vehicle to this
other location. The employer in this example need not have told the driver to run
every red light between Point A and Point B to be held liable. It is enough that
the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. This liability is
based on the idea that the "master employer" has the power to control the servant
employee's physical actions.
36. See GREGORY, supra note 6, § 52, at 118. See also WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 83A (1964) (Respondeat superior is "a condition imposed
by the common law in return for the privilege of utilizing the services of others
... in business matters.").
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 2 cmt. b (noting that liability for in-
dependent contractors is extremely limited); id. §§ 214-216 (dealing with a prin-
cipal's tort liability generally). See generally James B. McHugh, Risk
Administration in the Marketplace: A Reappraisal of the Independent Contractor
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but it still basically holds true,38 although it is occasionally the target
of criticism for lack of underlying rationale.39
If, however, an attorney is an independent contractor and is
deemed to be acting as an agent of a client, the law is less clear. Some
sources state that there is no liability for independent contractors,
without any consideration of agent or non-agent status.40 Such a
statement is incorrect because it overlooks well-accepted agency law
which imposes liability on a principal for the actually or apparently
authorized actions of an agent.4 1 This error may be due to confusion
of two subsets of law: respondeat superior and agency principles. 4 2
While a client is not responsible for an attorney's tortious conduct
through respondeat superior, agency law provides an additional basis
Rule, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1972) (discussing the rule of nonliability); KEETON,
supra note 34, § 71 (discussing imputed negligence and independent contractors).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (for the general rule of no lia-
bility); id. 88 410-429 (for exceptions to the general rule of no liability). See also
DOBBS, supra note 12, § 336 (discussing tort liability of the employer); GREGORY,
supra note 6, § 51, at 114-117 (discussing situations in which an employer is
responsible for the torts of a nonagent independent contractor under the respon-
deat superior doctrine); KEETON, supra note 34, § 71, at 509-16 (discussing the
rule and its exceptions); Harper, supra note 34 (discussing the rule's development
as the creation of an exception for the rule of liability); Roscoe T. Steffen, Inde-
pendent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1935) (discussing
the rule and its exceptions).
39. See Harper, supra note 34 (questioning rationale); McHugh, supra note 37 (not-
ing the lack of valid rationale and arguing for a rule of joint liability).
40. See, e.g., In re Berry Publ'g Serv., 231 B.R. 676, 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999)
("Under Illinois law a principal is not liable for an agent's torts, provided the
agent is not an employee."). For example, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
deals with the issue of tort liability of the nonservant agent in section 70 and
makes clear that tort liability is possible on several bases such as a tort within
the context of apparent authority. See KEETON, supra note 34, § 70, at 508. How-
ever, section 71 states: "For the torts of an independent contractor, as distin-
guished from a servant, it has long been said to be the general rule that there is
no vicarious liability upon the employer." Id. at § 71, at 509. The treatise then
clarifies that there are few settings of potential liability for independent contrac-
tors but these are exceptional situations of nonagent independent contractors.
The treatise never discusses, in this independent contractor section, the possibil-
ity of the agent independent contractor. It is thus no surprise that courts make
the same error regarding tort liability for independent contracts agents such as
attorneys.
41. See discussion supra section II.C.
42. The Restatement (Third) abandons the terms "independent contractor" and "ser-
vant" and simply defines the category of "employee" as the status required for
respondeat superior liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 6, Introduc-
tion. The omission of the category of "independent contractor" should assist in
eliminating some of the confusion exhibited in the courts in dealing with tort
liability for agents who are not servant employees. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Holabird
& Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ill. 2004) (discussing three different views of the
law, with the majority taking the position that an attorney cannot be an indepen-
dent contractor and an agent with regard to a particular action).
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of tort liability if the tortious acts are actually or apparently author-
ized. Regardless of the fact that the party is also an independent con-
tractor, the principal may be responsible if the independent contractor
acts with actual or apparent authority. This is not a conflicting basis
of liability; rather, it is an alternative basis for liability.4 3
Thus, tort liability is possible even when the agent is not a servant.
In addition to the sections of the Restatement (Second), the Restate-
ment (Third), and the RLGL that express the general notion of princi-
pal liability for agent action within actual or apparent authority,44
other sections of the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement
(Third) deal with torts specifically. For example, the Restatement
(Second) section 216 states:
A master or other principal may be liable to another whose interests have
been invaded by the tortious conduct of a servant or other agent, although the
principal does not personally violate a duty to such other or authorize the con-
duct of the agent causing the invasion.
4 5
The Restatement (Second) further states in section 265:
(1) A master or other principal is subject to liability for torts which result from
reliance upon, or belief in, statements or other conduct within an agent's ap-
parent authority.
(2) Unless there has been reliance, the principal is not liable in tort for con-
duct of a servant or other agent merely because it is within his apparent au-
thority or apparent scope of employment.
4 6
43. Some sources note this. See, for example, Dobb's torts treatise, which states:
The most common kind of vicarious liability is based upon the principle
of respondeat superior. Under that principle, private and public employ-
ers are generally jointly and severally liable along with the tortfeasor
employee for the torts of employees committed within the scope of em-
ployment. . . But, respondeat superior may apply to impose liability
upon the employer for contracts made by an agent within his authority
and also for many kinds of torts, including fraud and other torts that do
not entail physical harms.
DoBBs, supra note 12, § 333, at 905. See also Charles Davant IV, Employer Lia-
bility for Employee Fraud: Apparent Authority or Respondeat Superior?, 47 S.D.
L. REV. 554, 562-65 (2002) (discussing the two alternative bases for tort liability
in the context of the tort of fraud); Grease Monkey Int'l, Inc. v. Montoya, 904 P.2d
468, 473 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (discussing the alternatives).
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, §§ 1.01, 2.01, 2.03, 3.01; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), supra note 6, §§ 6-8; RLGL supra note 6, §§ 26-27.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 216.
46. Id. § 265. See also E.A. Prince & Son, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of the Southeast,
818 F. Supp. 910, 912 (D.S.C. 1993) (recognizing possibility of liability on the
basis of apparent authority); Taylor v. Costa Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 783, 786-87
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (discussing apparent authority as an alternate basis to servant
status for tort liability); Premium Fin. Specialists, Inc. v. Hullin, 90 S.W.3d 110,
113 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing possibility of responsibility on the basis of
apparent authority); Parlato v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 749 N.Y.S.2d 216, 222-225 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (recognizing possibility
of responsibility on basis of apparent authority). See generally KEETON, supra
note 34, § 70, at 508 (discussing responsibility and apparent authority).
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The Restatement (Second) also contains several sections specifi-
cally dealing with particular tort settings. Section 253 is particularly
relevant, addressing the responsibility of the principal for the agent's
actions in tortiously conducting or instituting legal proceedings. Sec-
tion 253 states:
A principal who authorizes a servant or other agent to institute or conduct
such legal proceedings as in his judgment are lawful and desirable for the
protection of the principal's interests is subject to liability to a person against
whom proceedings reasonably adapted to accomplish the principal's purposes
are tortiously brought by the agent.4
7
Comment (a) to this section notes that this is the situation of an attor-
ney and client.48 The comment adds to the section by stating: "The
principal is liable only if the conduct of the agent is, at least in part, to
carry out the purposes of the principal."49 Though the comment does
not clarify the reasoning of the drafters, the thought may have been
that the activity would only be within the realm of actual or apparent
authority if the activity was to carry out the purpose of the principal-
in whole or in part. Other sections of the Restatement (Second) deal
specifically with liability for matters such as fraud and defamation. 5 0
The Restatement (Third) takes a more general approach, but it
clearly makes a principal responsible for any authorized act as well as
for torts committed "with apparent authority in dealing with a third
party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal."51 Section 7.08
provides:
A principal is subject to vicarious liability for a tort committed by an agent in
dealing or communicating with a third party on or purportedly on behalf of
the principal when actions taken by the agent with apparent authority consti-
tute the tort or enable the agent to conceal its commission. 5 2
III. CLIENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTIOUS
CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS
A. Basic Liability Concepts Applied
On occasion, courts address whether a client should be responsible
for an attorney's tortious actions. This question and the courts' treat-
ment of it are particularly interesting when the tort is wrapped up in
the representation, such as the torts of wrongful use of civil process,
abuse of process, defamation, interference with a business relation-
ship, or fraud. Basic agency principles dictate that the attorney is not
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 253.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See id. § 254 (discussing defamation); id. §§ 256-264 (discussing misrepresen-
tations).
51. Id. § 7.03(2)(b).
52. Id. § 7.08.
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a servant employee but rather is an independent contractor. 53 Thus,
the client is not responsible for the attorney's tortious conduct in the
same manner that a master employer would be responsible for the
torts of a servant employee under respondeat superior.54 A client is
not responsible for the tortious acts an attorney commits solely be-
cause those acts are committed in the scope of the employment as a
master would be responsible for a servant. A third party injured when
an attorney's tortious actions cause a car wreck would not recover on
the basis of respondeat superior from the attorney's client, even if the
attorney was on the way to a deposition for that client.
Yet, the attorney, assuming the attorney has been engaged by the
client to perform legal services, is an agent of the client for some pur-
poses. Under traditional agency law, client tort responsibility can be
based on the principal-agent relationship even though the attorney is
an independent contractor, not a servant. The client can be responsi-
ble for the attorney's torts if (1) the client actually authorized the at-
torney's actions or (2) the attorney's actions are within the apparent
authority of the attorney.
The scope of the actual agency depends on what the client-princi-
pal has authorized the attorney to do. Some clients may authorize the
attorney generally to handle a particular matter or all of the client's
legal matters. This sort of authorization is the equivalent of the client
telling the attorney to play a chess game with the lone instruction be-
ing that the attorney should try to win. Other clients may take tighter
control and authorize specific steps in the representation. For exam-
ple, in a negotiation process, the client may specify each position the
attorney should take after each action or communication by the oppos-
ing party. This sort of authorization is the equivalent of the client
authorizing the attorney to make one move in the chess game and
specifying exactly what the move should be. After the opposing party
moves his chess piece, the client can authorize another specific move.
So, it is possible that the client-principal actually authorizes the
tortious actions of the attorney, either specifically or generally. If the
client generally has authorized the attorney to act and the specific tor-
tious actions are the choice of the attorney, the tortious actions may
have been within the scope of the authority. This would be true, per-
haps especially so, if the client communicated to the attorney that the
client wanted to succeed at any cost.
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 14N cmt. a ("[A]ttorneys ... are inde-
pendent contractors . . . ."). See also discussion supra section II.B.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2.04 ("An employer is subject to liabil-
ity for torts committed by employees while acting in the scope of their employ-
ment."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 2 cmt. a (stating that a master is
liable for physical harm caused to third persons by the tort of the servant within
the scope of the employment). See also discussion supra section II.D.
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Even if an attorney's actual authority is unclear, or, perhaps hard
to prove, apparent authority is possible in the settings of wrongful use
of civil proceedings, abuse of process, interference with a business re-
lationship, defamation, or fraud. The client-principal, by enlisting the
services of the attorney to handle the legal matter, represents to the
opposing party and to the court that the attorney-agent has the au-
thority to speak and act as is customary in such a setting.55 The Re-
statement (Second) specifically deals with the issue of the client's
responsibility for the attorney's actions regarding the institution of le-
gal proceedings, defamation, and fraud.56 Even without the specific
provisions, however, the application of both the Restatement (Sec-
ond)'s and the Restatement (Third)'s general provisions lead to the
possibility of client responsibility for tortious actions of the client's
attorney. 57
B. Recent Case Law
1. Traditional Approach
Courts' reactions to the question of a client's responsibility for tor-
tious actions by the client's attorney in settings entangled with the
representation are interesting in terms of the courts' confusion about
this area of the law, in terms of motivating policy, and in terms of
what this policy discloses about views of the attorney-client relation-
ship. Some courts have adhered fairly closely to traditional agency
law and the Restatement (Second).5 8 For example, in the recent case
of SouthTrust Bank v. Jones, Morrison, Womack & Dearing,59 a client
settled with a third party and then pursued indemnity from several
law firms. The actions of the firms constituted the basis of the third
party's claim against the client for malicious prosecution and abuse of
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 7.08 ("A principal is subject to vicari-
ous liability for a tort committed by an agent in dealing or communicating with a
third party on or purportedly on behalf of the principal when actions taken by the
agent with apparent authority constitute the tort or enable the agent to conceal
its commission."). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 265(1) ("A
master or other principal is subject to liability for torts which result from reliance
upon, or belief in, statements or other conduct within an agent's apparent author-
ity" but reliance is essential.).
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, §§ 253-64.
A principal who authorizes a servant or other agent to institute or con-
duct such legal proceedings as in his judgment are lawful and desirable
for the protection of the principal's interests is subject to liability to a
person against whom proceedings reasonably adapted to accomplish the
principal's purposes are tortiously brought by the agent.
Id. § 253 (1958).
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 7.08.
58. The Restatement (Third) is simply too new to have had much consideration by the
courts or much effect on judicial decisions.
59. 939 So. 2d. 885 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
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process. The client, a bank, had engaged a law firm for the collection
of a corporate credit card debt. That firm then engaged another firm.
Eventually, these firms obtained a default judgment against the third
party though he was not responsible for the debt, he was never served,
and he was at all times living at the address listed for him in the local
telephone listings. These actions occurred after the bank had in-
structed its contact law firm to close the file.60
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that the lower court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the law firms was inappropri-
ate.6 1 The Alabama court applied general agency law to hold that a
client can be responsible for the tortious actions of the client's attor-
neys. 62 The court reached this result by acknowledging that attorneys
are agents of clients;63 that principals are responsible, in tort and oth-
erwise, for the acts of agents;64 and that, therefore, client-principals
are responsible for the tortious actions of attorney-agents. 6 5 The
SouthTrust court reached its result without any discussion of the in-
dependent contractor status of attorneys or the effect of that status.
Rather, the court relied upon Restatement (Second) section 253, the
section specifically imposing liability on a principal in the context of
institution of legal proceedings and upon Alabama precedent, to state
that a principal such as a client could be responsible for an agent's
intentional torts if the acts were "'[1] in the line and scope of his em-
ployment ... ; or [2] that the acts were in furtherance of the business
of [the principal] . . . ; or [3] that [the principal] participated in, au-
thorized, or ratified the wrongful acts."' 6 6 The SouthTrust court con-
cluded that the banking client could be responsible for the law firms'
actions even if those actions were outside the scope of the employment
and expressly not authorized since there was no evidence that the at-
torneys had a purpose "to accomplish some personal objective rather
than to further the Bank's business objective of collecting a debt."67
Even without the benefit of section 253 of the Restatement (Second),
one can easily argue that these attorneys were acting with apparent
authority, and thus, the client was responsible in tort.68
60. See id. at 890-93.
61. See id. at 902.
62. See id. at 903-04.
63. See id. at 903.
64. See id. at 903-04.
65. SouthTrust Bank v. Jones, Morrison, Womack & Dearing, 939 So. 2d. 885, 906
(Ala. Civ. App. 2005).
66. Id. at 904-905 (quoting Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 477 So. 2d 364, 365 (Ala.
1985) (emphasis added)).
67. Id. at 906.
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 7.08.
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Likewise, other courts have followed traditional agency princi-
ples. 69 In Koutsogiannis v. BB & T,70 the South Carolina Supreme
Court reviewed the question of whether the client, a bank, could be
responsible for the tortious actions of the attorney in pursuing a debt
against a third party. After a jury verdict against the bank and in
favor of the third party, the bank claimed the lower court erred in not
giving the jury an instruction about the lack of liability for indepen-
dent contractors. 7 1 The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed,
stating that the attorney was an agent of BB &T and the attorney's
actions in engaging in settlement negotiations and in submitting a
proposed summary judgment order were within the scope of the repre-
sentation. 7 2 The Court stated: "[T]he trial court did not err by failing
to charge the law of independent contractor and charging only the law
of agency."7 3 One can assume that the Court viewed attorney actions
within the scope of the representation as apparently, even if not actu-
ally, authorized by the client.
69. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 768 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988). In Southwestern Bell, the court held that the client can be responsible if
the acts are "committed by the agent for the purpose of accomplishing the mission
entrusted to him by his principal." Id. at 759. The third party claimed that the
attorney had committed tortious conduct in the process of collecting an agreed
judgment. Id. at 758. The attorneys, at the time of the allegedly tortious con-
duct, were acting on the client's behalf so the client was liable. Id. at 759-60.
In United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Groen, 486 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985), the Indiana Court of Appeals stated that by virtue of the retainer, the
attorney has implied authority to do all things necessary to accomplish the pur-
pose of the engagement. Id. at 573. The court held "that neither the absence of a
master-servant relationship nor the characterization of the attorney as an inde-
pendent contractor is a bar to liability of the client for the torts of the attorney
acting within the scope of his authority." Id. at 574.
In Nyer v. Carter, 367 A.2d 1375, 1377 (Me. 1977), the client instructed the
attorney to, in the words of the Court, "do whatever was necessary to preserve the
assets of the assignors." Id. at 1377. The third party claimed that the attorney
committed malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Court found the cli-
ent responsible for the attorney's allegedly tortious actions even though the client
did not know about the problematic legal action. Id. at 1378. The Court stated
that "the principal is liable if the act was done within the course and scope of the
agency employment, even though appellant did not specifically authorize the tor-
tious conduct." Id. at 1378. Note that the Nyer Court uses the phrase, "scope of
... employment," which is a phrase used for imposing liability on a master em-
ployer for the actions of a servant employee. This Court probably did not truly
intend to imply that the attorney had servant status. Rather, the more likely
interpretation is that the Court was really discussing the point that the conduct
was within the scope of the attorney's actual or apparent authority.
70. 616 S.E.2d 425 (S.C. 2005).
71. See id. at 427.
72. See id. at 428.
73. Id. See also Crane Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cresap, 103 P.3d 535 (Mont. 2004) (ad-
dressing claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, deceit, the Court held that
the client was responsible for negligent acts of attorney-agent but that the attor-
ney was not responsible in tort).
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2. Reserved Approach
Some courts apply a more reserved version of agency law. 7 4 In
Givens v. Mulliken ex rel. McElwaney,75 the Tennessee Supreme
Court evaluated whether an insured client and the insurer providing
the legal representation under an insurance policy could be responsi-
ble for the tortious acts of the attorney. A third party claimed the
attorney defending the client had committed torts such as invasion of
privacy and abuse of process.7 6 The Court stated that the typical situ-
ation of attorney and insurer or attorney and insured is one in which
the attorney is an independent contractor. The insurer has no right to
control the "methods or means" the attorney uses to defend the in-
sured. 7 7 While the Court noted that the insured client has significant
74. See, e.g., In re Germain, 249 B.R. 47, 50 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that
client must have knowledge, client must consent, or client must ratify the attor-
ney's actions); Miller v. Ryan, 706 N.E.2d 244, 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (stating
that client is responsible only for acts of the attorney within the scope of the
authority; contact with medical peer review panel in violation of ethics rules gov-
erning lawyers was not within the scope of authority of the attorney); Baldasarre
v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 465 (N.J. 1993) ("An innocent client should not be held
vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of his or her attorney against the at-
torney's other clients if the client does not direct, advise, consent to or participate
in the attorney's improper conduct."); Baglini v. Lauletta, 768 A.2d 825, 839 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (stating that clients bear no responsibility unless they
"direct, advise, consent to or participate in the attorney's improper conduct")
(quoting Baldassare, 625 A.2d at 465); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1994) (stating that employment is not enough; client must be "implicated in
some way other than merely having entrusted his legal representation to the at-
torney"); Demopolis v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Washington, 796 P.2d 426, 434
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that the client is responsible for the defamatory
statements of the attorney only if the attorney acted within the scope of the em-
ployment and with the client's knowledge and consent). See also Plant v. Trust
Co. of Columbus, 310 S.E.2d 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). The Georgia court specifi-
cally refused to apply "ordinary agency law." Id. at 746-47. The court stated that
the client must have "expressly or impliedly authorized, knew of, or ratified, the
personal act of verbal and emotional abuse . . . ." Id. at 747. The court cannot
presume authority "from the mere fact of general retention .... Id. at 747. The
attorney had been instructed to use "whatever arrangements [the attorney]
wanted ...." Id. at 746.
75. 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2002).
76. Id. at 390.
77. Id. at 394. Other courts have addressed the question of the liability of the insurer
for the tortious conduct of the lawyer engaged by the insurer to defend the in-
sured. While the Givens court provides that liability is possible though unlikely,
other courts seem to deny liability more categorically. For example, in Aetna Cas.
& Sur. v. Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 631 So. 2d 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994), the court refused to impose liability on the insurer for the attorney's negli-
gence. The court first explained its decision using language suggesting that no
liability can be imposed because the attorney is an independent contractor. The
court concluded, however, with the more important fact that the insurer is the
principal in the customary relationship, not the insured. See id. at 308. Note that
the third party in the typical scenario in which this question arises is the insured
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authority and right of control, the client does not have the type of con-
trol (control over "the time, place, methods and means") that would
make the attorney a servant employee rather than an independent
contractor. 78 The Court recognized an exception to the rule of nonlia-
bility of principals for the torts of independent contractors in the situ-
ation in which the principal, in fact, "directed, commanded, or
knowingly authorized" the conduct.7 9 The Court explicitly stated that
the existence of the employment relationship itself was insufficient to
establish liability and that liability cannot result "solely from the ex-
ercise of that attorney's independent professional judgment."8 0 In so
stating, the Court was reacting to the intermediate appellate court's
client. This paradigm is quite different from the situation in which the third
party seeking to establish liability of the client is truly a stranger to the relation-
ship between attorney and client. See also Ingersoll-Rand Equip. Corp. v. Trans-
portation Ins. Co., 963 F. Supp. 453, 454 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that insurer
had no liability for attorney malpractice); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal.
Rptr. 511, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (stating that malpractice liability of attorney
cannot be imputed to insurer); Herbert A. Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co.,
788 N.E.2d 522, 541 (Mass. 2003) (holding that insurer had no liability for attor-
ney's malpractice); Feliberty v. Damon, 527 N.E. 2d 261, 265 (N.Y. 1988) (Doctor
insured claimed the attorney provided by the insurer committed malpractice; the
court found the insurer not responsible for the attorney's negligence.).
Other courts disagree. See, e.g., Boyd Bros. Transp. Co., Inc. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Cos., 729 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir. 1984) (insurer liability for attorney's
actions possible); Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 525, 530 (5th
Cir. 1962) ("Those whom the Insurer selects to execute its promises, whether at-
torneys, physicians, no less than company-employed adjusters, are its agents for
whom it has the customary legal liability.").
Another similar setting is the situation in which a union provides a lawyer to
a union member and then the union member claims that the provided attorney
has committed malpractice and that the union is responsible. See, e.g., Mamorella
v. Derkasch, 716 N.Y.S.2d 211, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding that the union
was not responsible for attorney's malpractice).
78. Givens, 75 S.W.3d at 396.
79. Id. at 390 (regarding the insurer). See also id. at 397 (regarding the insured cli-
ent). Unfortunately, the Givens court talks in terms of right of control and exer-
cise of control in this discussion. See id. at 395 ("[A]lthough an insurer clearly
lacks the right to control an attorney retained to defend an insured, we simply
cannot ignore the practical reality that the insurer may seek to exercise actual
control over its retained attorneys in this context.") (emphasis added). See also
id. at 396 ("[Wlhen the insurer does undertake to exercise actual control over the
actions of the insured's attorney, then it may be held vicariously liable for any
harm to a plaintiff proximately caused thereby."). The power to exercise control
is a major factor in deciding whether a party is a servant rather than an indepen-
dent contractor. The Givens court's mention of control may be confusing and lead
some to believe that the court is finding that the attorney is a servant. In reality,
the court is simply following agency law that allows tort liability for independent
contractors if the tortious action occurs in the actual or apparent authority of the
independent contractor. A grant, or apparent grant, of authority is not synony-
mous with the power to control and does not necessarily convert an independent
contractor into a servant employee.
80. Id. at 396 (regarding the insurer).
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treatment of the case. The appellate court had stated that the law
presumes that the attorney acts with the authority of the client, so the
client must be responsible for the attorney's tortious actions on the
basis of the attorney-client relationship alone.81 The Tennessee Su-
preme Court stated that the "presumption regarding the apparent au-
thority of an attorney was accurately stated," but that the "approach
is too broad because it exposes the client to tort liability for virtually
every action taken by the attorney during the representation, irre-
spective of whether the client actually directed or knowingly author-
ized those actions."82 The Court worried that to use such a broad
approach would require too much supervision by clients, parties who
are not capable of doing so. 8 3
Such a holding and such statements indicate that the Tennessee
Supreme Court's view of a grant of authority is one of a very specific
grant, as opposed to a more general grant. The Court indicated that it
would recognize liability when the client or insurer tells the attorney
the move to make but probably not when the client tells the attorney
to take action to win or to achieve certain objectives. In addition, the
Court's statements about apparent authority certainly seem to indi-
cate that apparent authority cannot be recognized in the attorney-cli-
ent setting.
In In re Germain, 8 4 the Bankruptcy Court in the Western District
of New York evaluated a claim against a client for actions of the cli-
ent's attorneys. The client retained the attorneys, a firm running a
"debt reduction" program, "'to render all needed and necessary ser-
vices and to take any and all actions and proceedings necessary which
[the firm] may deem advisable to settle and compromise in whole or in
part certain specified and outstanding creditor actions, claims, pro-
ceedings, demands and obligations."85 The third party, a law firm,
claimed malicious prosecution. The client was unaware of the attor-
neys' filing of the allegedly improper litigation, and there was no evi-
dence of the client's desire, specifically, to sue the third party.S6
Because of the peculiar quasi-judicial role of an attorney, the court
refused to allow the scope of an attorney's authority to extend to
wrongful acts. As partial justification for its position, the court noted
that the innocent third party in this case was a law firm that should
accept the "overhead costs" of this situation while the client, a con-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 397.
83. Id. at 397. See also Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(expressing the same concern that allowing liability on the basis of the relation-
ship alone would create an impossible duty of supervision beyond the capabilities
of the typical client).
84. 249 B.R. 47 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000).
85. Id. at 48-49 (quoting the retainer agreement between the client and attorneys).
86. Id. at 49.
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sumer with typical debt problems, "should not be expected to bear the
increased cost of doing business that her creditor's lawyers suffer
when her lawyer oversteps the bounds of proper legal process."8 7
Such a statement is interesting in that the court is looking at the equi-
ties and concluding that the client is the innocent party more deserv-
ing of protection. The fact that the client did in fact engage the law
firm was irrelevant to this court. The fact that the third party was a
law firm, though an innocent one, somehow made it the appropriate
bearer of the burden.
3. Very Limited Approach
Occasionally, a court just gets this confusing area of law wrong.
The court is not evaluating interests and choosing to diverge from the
accepted rule. Rather, the court, apparently, misapplies the accepted
rule. An example of this is In re Berry Publishing Services,8 8 where
the court simply stated that a principal can be responsible for an
agent's torts only if the agent is an employee.8 9 Unsurprisingly, the
court concluded that the client could not be responsible for the tortious
actions of the client's attorney.90 This court ignored any liability re-
sulting from the agency apart from the servant employee liability.9 1
In other cases, the courts seem more clearly to choose to apply the
law differently. In Horwitz v. Holabird & Root,92 the Supreme Court
of Illinois had before it a claim that a client was responsible for the
client's law firm's tortious interference with business relationships.
The client, an architectural business, engaged the law firm to collect a
debt from a real estate development entity that had used the architec-
tural business's services. As part of the discovery process in the debt
collection matter, the law firm became aware of the investors and bus-
iness associates of the real estate entity. The real estate entity di-
vulged its tax returns after obtaining a confidentiality agreement from
the architectural firm's counsel. The law firm then contacted many of
these investors and associates by letter and informed them that the
real estate entity had apportioned itself a greater share of the busi-
ness than was appropriate and that the investors' share of the loss
was reported as less than what was appropriate. The letters were on
87. Id. at 51.
88. 231 B.R. 676 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999).
89. Id. at 682.
90. Id. at 682-83. Sometimes, it is difficult to determine whether the court is making
a policy decision against liability or rather simply misapplying the law out of
confusion. See, e.g., Lynn v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 427, 428-29 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (a lawyer can be an agent of the client in business transactions but is
an independent contractor in the role of trial attorney and a principal is not re-
sponsible for an independent contractor's torts absent compelling public policy).
91. See In re Berry Publ'g Serv., 231 B.R. 676, 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999).
92. 816 N.E.2d 272 (Ill. 2004).
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law firm stationery and contained the following statement: "[W]e re-
present [the architectural firm] who [has] a judgment against [the real
estate entity] ."93 The trial court granted the motion of the architec-
tural business, the client, for summary judgment on the basis that as
a matter of law the client could not be responsible for the actions of its
law firm.94 The appellate court relied upon agency law and held that
the client could be responsible for the acts of the law firm, the client's
agent. The appellate court found that there were genuine issues of
fact as to whether the acts of the law firm were "within the scope of its
authority" and as to whether the client ratified the actions of the law
firm.95
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded "that when, as here, an at-
torney acts pursuant to the exercise of independent professional judg-
ment, he or she acts presumptively as an independent contractor
whose intentional misconduct may generally not be imputed to the cli-
ent, subject to factual exceptions." 96 The Court recognized that inde-
pendent contractors can be agents and that attorneys are generally in
this category. 9 7 However, the Court then stated:
Nonetheless, when attorneys act pursuant to the exercise of independent pro-
fessional judgment, they possess such considerable autonomy over the details
and manner of performing their work that they are presumptively indepen-
dent contractors for purposes of imposing vicarious liability. Accordingly,
where a plaintiff seeks to hold a client vicariously liable for the attorney's
allegedly intentional tortious conduct, a plaintiff must prove facts demon-
strating either that the client specifically directed, controlled, or authorized
the attorney's precise method of performing the work or that the client subse-
quently ratified acts performed in the exercise of the attorney's independent
judgment. If there is no evidence that the client directed, controlled, author-
ized, or ratified the attorney's allegedly tortious conduct, no vicarious liability
can attach. 9 8
The Court found no evidence of client direction, control, authorization,
or ratification. 99
In recognizing the conflict with section 253 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond), which allows liability, the Horwitz Court stated that it disagreed
with the Restatement's "discounting" of the ethical obligations that
constrain an attorney to not take action that would be tortious.10 0 In
addition, the Court seemed especially concerned with not creating a
precedent that would encourage client control of litigation. The Court
stated: "Were we to hold otherwise, we would in effect compel clients
93. Id. at 274.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 275.
96. Id. at 278.
97. Id. at 279.
98. Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 279 (Ill. 2004).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 280.
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in similar cases to oversee or micromanage every action taken by their
attorneys during the course of the attorney-client relationship, and ob-
ligate clients to take control of their representation at the slightest
hint of potentially wrongful conduct on the part of their attorneys."1o1
The supervision required would cause plaintiffs not to file suit, would
cause defendants not to defend vigorously, and would make clients
"'ultimately responsible for their own legal representation .... '"102
After dismissing the concept of apparent authority by noting that
the parties did not raise the theory,'0 3 the Court stated that "an attor-
ney can be both an independent contractor and an agent, but regard-
ing particular conduct is either one or the other, not both."104 The
Court further reasoned that "clients are reasonably justified in expect-
ing that their attorneys will represent them ethically and within the
bounds of the law."105
This opinion is striking not only for its rejection of the Restatement
(Second) principle in section 253 regarding client responsibility for in-
stitution of legal proceedings, but also for its novel interpretation that
attorneys cannot be both independent contractors and agents at the
same time, though the Restatement (Second) clearly provides that
agent independent contractors exist and that attorneys are good ex-
amples of such.' 0 6 While the Horwitz opinion states that the client
can be responsible if the client "directed, controlled, authorized, or rat-
ified" the action,' 0 7 the Court seems to eliminate the possibility of a
general grant of authority as a basis for liability. If the client does not
tell the attorney to send out the offending letters to the investors,
there is no client responsibility.
As Justice McMorrow, author of one of the dissenting opinions in
Horwitz, points out, the majority's position "is unnecessarily and im-
properly creating a wholesale change to the traditional laws of agency
with the issuance of its opinion."' 0 8 By taking the position that when
101. Id. at 281.
102. Id. (quoting Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)).
103. Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 282 (Ill. 2004).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 283.
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, § 14N.
107. 816 N.E.2d at 279.
108. Id. at 295 (McMorrow, dissenting). "[T]he majority's holding rests upon incorrect
premises and uses reasoning which is sure to engender confusion and uncertainty
among the bench and bar." Id. Another dissent notes:
Along the way, the majority ignores previous holdings of this court re-
garding general agency principles, relies on inapposite and ill-founded
authority from other jurisdictions, and diverges from the Restatement,
the Seventh Circuit, and our own appellate court, each of which has ar-
rived at what I submit is the proper conclusion, that a client may be held
vicariously liable for the actions of his chosen counsel, his agent, by ap-
plication of ordinary principles of agency law.
Id. at 303 (Freeman, dissenting).
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exercising "independent professional judgment" 0 9 the attorney is not
an agent of the client, the Court is also saying that at that time the
attorney owes the client no fiduciary duties. Such a position has far-
reaching ramifications. Can an attorney ever take action as an agent
of the client that has not been specifically and particularly detailed
and directed by the client? Any decision by the attorney or choice of
action would seem to make the attorney a nonagent for the purposes
of the action. Justice McMorrow suggests that the appropriate ap-
proach is to acknowledge that attorneys are agents of their clients but
that the presumption should be that the agent's authority does not
extend to intentional tortious acts of the attorney.110 Thus, clients
would not have an impossible burden of supervision, and the standard
would not chill the enforcement of legal rights."'1
C. Why Do Some Courts Deviate from Traditional Agency
Law?
The Horwitz majority, and to some extent Justice McMorrow's dis-
senting opinion in Horwitz, focus on the client's burden if the court
created precedent encouraging supervision of attorney conduct, the
chilling effect a precedent of client responsibility would have on taking
legal action, and the client's justifiable expectation of ethical and legal
attorney conduct.112 Other courts consider these issues as well.113
Some courts talk of the "innocent client."114 Yet, these courts do not
address the rights of the innocent third party." 5 If a client selects
counsel, and if counsel takes action later deemed tortious, why is it
unfair to protect the innocent third party and to make the client re-
sponsible to that third party? The client has the balm of a malpractice
action, discipline proceedings, and the like to avenge the wrong vis-A-
vis the attorney. As Justice Freeman writes in a dissenting opinion in
Horwitz, "all agency liability is based on the premise that it is the
client's responsibility to choose its agent carefully, at risk of being held
109. Id. at 279.
110. Id. at 290 (McMorrow, dissenting). Justice McMorrow was of the opinion that
there was sufficient evidence of client authorization, either "expressly or im-
pliedly" such that summary judgment was improper. Id. at 295-96.
111. Id. at 294.
112. See id. at 280-81 and 294.
113. See, e.g., Givens v. Mullikin ex rel. McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 397 (Tenn. 2004)
(encouragement of a level of supervision not possible by the typical user of legal
services); Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 76-77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (encouraging
supervision not possible by the typical client).
114. See, e.g., Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 464-65 (N.J. 1993) ("innocent
client").
115. The court in In re Germain, 249 B.R. 47, 51-52 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000), consid-
ered the position of the third party but concluded that since the third party was
itself a law firm working in the debt collection area, it was the better party to
take the risk than the client of the offending law firm.
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liable for their actions if they behave wrongly in promoting the princi-
pal's interests in those actions with the conduct of which they are
entrusted."116
In addition, Justice Freeman suggests that one must also consider
the "unscrupulous" client who engages an attorney "known to 'push
the envelope' and then, ostrich-like, hide[s] his head in the sand so as
to disavow any specific involvement in the attorney's methods, and
walk[s] away from any wrongdoing committed by his chosen agent on
his behalf in the service of his cause."117 It is naive to believe that
there are not clients out there who strenuously encourage their attor-
neys to win at all costs. When attorneys succumb to those pressures
and engage in tortious actions those clients are not innocent by any
stretch of the imagination. Yet, some courts give these clients a free
pass. Why do some courts not find the balance of equities struck by
traditional agency rules adequate? Why protect the client rather than
the innocent third party? What does such a stance tell us about the
courts' view of the lawyer-client relationship?
IV. CLIENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTLEMENTS
BY COUNSEL
The vast majority of courts are wary of traditional agency concepts
in the context of settlement agreements. Traditional agency concepts
would dictate that the client could authorize the attorney to settle a
matter either by granting the attorney express authority or by grant-
ing the attorney authority impliedly. In addition, apparent authority
could apply to bind a client to a settlement entered into by the attor-
ney if the client took actions that led a reasonable third party dealing
with the attorney to believe the client authorized the attorney to settle
even though the client had not so authorized the attorney. Most
courts do not apply agency concepts to the settlement context in the
traditional manner.1 1 8
A. Settlement is the Client's Decision
1. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct ("MRPC"), the ethics standards in effect in the majority of United
116. Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 816 N.E.2d 272, 303 (Ill. 2004) (Freeman,
dissenting).
117. Id. at 302 (Freeman, dissenting).
118. For a broader discussion of attorney authority regarding settlement, see Grace
M. Giesel, Enforcement of Settlement Contracts: The Problem of the Attorney
Agent, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 543 (1999); Dean C. Harvey, Settling in New
York: Abdicating Traditional Agency Principles in the Context of Settlement Dis-
putes, 9 TouRo L. REV. 449 (1993).
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States jurisdictions, state in Rule 1.2 that as between attorney and
client, the decision to settle is the client's decision.11 9 Rule 1.2(a) gen-
erally states that decisions about objectives are the client's decisions,
and specifically states that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's deci-
sion whether to settle a matter."'120 Even earlier ethics standards
agreed with this proposition. 12 1 In addition, Rule 1.4 provides that a
lawyer must "reasonably consult with the client"122 and "keep the cli-
ent reasonably informed about the status of the matter."123
2. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
("RLGL") places the right to decide important matters, such as
whether to settle, on the client. 124 The RLGL goes further, however,
by stating that decisions like settlement are the client's "except when
the client has validly authorized the lawyer to make the particular
decision."12 5 In addition, the RLGL states that if a client grants au-
thority to a lawyer regarding settlement, the client can, of course, re-
voke that authority even if an agreement with the attorney states to
the contrary.12 6 Like the MRPC, the RLGL requires the attorney to
keep the client informed and to consult with the client.12 7 Thus, the
RLGL meshes with agency principles in recognizing the client's right
to authorize the attorney to act with regard to settlement. The RLGL
119. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2006).
120. Id.
121. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1983), which states:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the
cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is enti-
tled to make decisions on his own. But otherwise the authority to make
decisions is exclusively that of the client .... [I]t is for the client to
decide whether he will accept a settlement offer ....
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1983). See also Judith L.
Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1049, 1054 n.12 (1984) (quoting Hoffman's
Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, Resolution XIX, in 2 D.
Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 752-75 (2d ed. 1836), which stated: "Should
my client be disposed to compromise, or to settle his claim, or defense; and espe-
cially if he be content with a verdict or judgment, that has been rendered; or
having no opinion of his own, relies with confidence on mine, I will in all such
cases greatly respect his wishes and real interest.").
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (2006).
123. Id. at R. 1.4 (a)(3).
124. See RLGL, supra note 6, § 22.
125. Id. See also id. § 21 (stating that the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer
has the authority to make certain decisions).
126. See id. § 22(3).
127. See id. § 20.
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agrees with MRPC that the attorney does not have a general authority
to settle. 128
Section 27 of the RLGL addresses apparent authority as it relates
to attorneys:
A lawyer's act is considered to be that of the client in proceedings before a
tribunal or in dealings with a third person if the tribunal or third person rea-
sonably assumes that the lawyer is authorized to do the act on the basis of the
client's (and not the lawyer's) manifestations of such authorization. 1 2 9
Although the RLGL does not specifically address apparent authority
in the settlement context, nothing in the RLGL is inconsistent with
application of the concept of apparent authority to the settlement
scenario.
B. Case Law
Many courts start from the proposition that the settlement deci-
sion is the client's decision and conclude that, as a result of that pro-
position, the traditional rules of agency cannot apply. Courts agree
that a client can expressly bestow authority to settle on an attorney-
agent.13 0 Some courts, however, seem to state that the only way an
attorney can have authority to settle is by express authorization. If
courts really mean what they say on this point,13 1 such a statement
necessarily prevents recognizing implied actual authority and appar-
ent authority. For example, in Reutzel v. Douglas,13 2 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania stated that "a client's attorney may not settle a
case without the client's grant of express authority, and such author-
ity can only exist where the principal specifically grants the agent the
authority to perform a certain task on the principal's behalf."133 In
response to an argument that the attorney might have apparent au-
128. See id. § 23 (setting forth the general authority situations: to refuse unlawful
representation and to act as required by the law or order of the tribunal).
129. Id. § 27. See also id. § 21 cmt. a ("A lawyer who has acted with apparent author-
ity ... to settle a case, binds the client as against third persons.").
130. See, e.g., Jago v. Special Needs Home Health Care, 190 S.W.3d 352, 353 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2006) ("The law is clear that express client authority must be had" for a
settlement by an attorney to be binding on the client.); Navajo Tribe of Indians v.
Hanosh Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 749 P.2d 90, 92 (N.M. 1988) ("[An attorney's au-
thority to settle must be expressly conferred."); Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 A.2d 787,
789-90 (Pa. 2005) ("The law in this jurisdiction is clear and well-settled that an
attorney must have express authority in order to bind a client to a settlement
agreement.").
131. In Navajo Tribe of Indians v. Hanosh Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 749 P.2d 90, 92-93
(N.M. 1988), the court makes the statement that express authority is required
yet, inconsistently, goes on to apply apparent authority. See also Trs. of Mich.
Reg'l Council of Carpenters' Employee Benefits Fund v. Custom Poured Walls,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 939, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2004) ("specific authority" to settle
required; apparent authority possible).
132. 870 A.2d 787 (Pa. 2005).
133. Id. at 790.
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thority, the Reutzel Court stated that a "statement that an attorney
can, bind his client to a settlement based on apparent authority alone
is simply an incorrect statement of the law."134 The Court also clari-
fied that implied actual authority is not a possibility by quoting an
earlier Pennsylvania case which stated that "'apparent or implied au-
thority does not extend to unauthorized acts which will result in the
surrender of any substantial right of the client, or the imposition of
new liabilities or burdens upon him."'1 3 5
Likewise, in Jago v. Special Needs Home Health Care,1 3 6 the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals stated: "The law is clear that express client
authority must be had to enter into a settlement agreement, and ap-
parent authority is insufficient."1 3 7 One is left to wonder where im-
plied authority would fit here. Interestingly, the court cited Clark v.
Burden,138 a Kentucky Supreme Court opinion in which the Court
stated that "in ordinary circumstances, express client authority is re-
quired,"1 39 but then-in contradiction-mentioned that "[a]ctive par-
ticipation [by the client] in the particulars of settlement may be
deemed to create implied authority."1 40 Finally, the Clark Court
stated that apparent authority is generally unavailable, but a court
could, in the interest of justice, assign responsibility if a third party's
rights were "substantially and adversely affected by an attorney pos-
sessing apparent authority but who lacked actual authority."141
While such an opinion muddies the water in terms of when a court
will recognize attorney authority, the opinion makes clear that the
traditional agency doctrine, at least with regard to apparent author-
ity, does not apply.
Some courts are willing to apply the doctrine of apparent authority
in the settlement context.1 4 2 Most of these courts do not view the cli-
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Starling v. W. Erie Ave. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 3 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa.
1939)). See also Fender v. Wal-Mart Corp., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196-97 (N.D.
Okla. 2004) ("[A]bsent express authority, an attorney cannot enter into a settle-
ment and thereby compromise the rights of his client.").
136. 190 S.W.3d 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006).
137. Id. at 353.
138. 917 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1996).
139. Id. at 576.
140. Id. at 576-77.
141. Id. at 577. See also Dixie Operating Co. v. Exxon Co., 493 So. 2d 61, 63-64 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("Adherence to this rule does not preclude the application of
principles of equity when a party has relied to its irreparable detriment on the
representations of the opposing attorney.").
142. See, e.g., United States v. United States Currency in the Sum Six Hundred Sixty
Thousand Two Hundred Dollars, More or Less, 423 F. Supp. 2d 14 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (recognizing the doctrine but finding actual authority); In re Kollel Mateh
Efraim, L.L.C., 334 B.R. 554 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2005); Trs. of Mich. Reg'l Council
of Carpenters' Employee Benefits Fund v. Custom Poured Walls, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 2d 939 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Makins v. District of Columbia, 861 A.2d 590,
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ent's act of retaining the attorney as a sufficient act to mislead a third
party into believing the attorney is authorized to settle. Thus, reten-
tion alone does not establish apparent authority.143 The retention of
the attorney also does not create implied actual authority. The client,
by engaging the attorney to handle the matter, does not grant the at-
torney authority to settle. 1 44
In contrast, Georgia courts take the position that retaining the at-
torney to handle the matter bestows actual and apparent authority
upon the attorney to settle. Only by notifying third parties of a limita-
tion on this authority can the apparent authority be defeated. For ex-
ample, in Speed v. Muhanna,145 the attorney represented a client in
relation to injuries received in a store. Before the treating physician
would agree to be deposed, he required a promise that the matter
would not involve an action for medical negligence. The plaintiffs at-
torney agreed. The client, however, later sued the doctor for malprac-
tice through the use of a different attorney. The doctor defended with
the promise of counsel that there would be no medical malpractice ac-
tion. The court found actual authority for the attorney's promise be-
cause the attorney was authorized to "investigate and pursue 'any and
all claims which [the plaintiff] may have against [the store], and any
other Defendants later named or identified, as a result of the incident
at [the store]."146 The court concluded that even if actual authority
was not present, apparent authority was present because the client in
no way notified any third party that the attorney's authority was lim-
ited.1 47 The court noted that the client's remedy is against the attor-
595 (D.C. 2004); Stearns Bank N.A. v. Palmer, 182 S.W.3d 624 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005).
143. See Fennell v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 1989) ("A client does not
create apparent authority for his attorney to settle a case merely by retaining the
attorney."); Edwards v. Born, Inc., 792 F.2d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 1986) ("It is well
settled that an attorney does not possess the inherent authority to compromise by
virtue of his retention for the litigation."); Makins v. District of Columbia, 861
A.2d 590, 595 (D.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("Retention of the attorney by itself is insuffi-
cient to bestow actual or apparent authority.").
144. See Fender v. Wal-Mart Corp., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1196 (N.D. Okla. 2004)
("'The relationship of attorney and client does not imply that a power has been
given to the attorney to compromise and settle a claim.'" (quoting Humphreys v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 399 S.E.2d 60, 62 (W. Va. 1990))).
145. 619 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
146. Id. at 327 (emphasis omitted).
147. Id. at 328. The Georgia Uniform Court Rules state that counsel of record have
apparent authority to "enter into agreements on behalf of their clients in civil
actions." GEOR. UNIF. RULES SUPER. CTS. R. 4.12. Case law has applied the con-
cept regardless of whether there is a matter filed with a court. See Pembroke
State Bank v. Warnell, 471 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1996); Brumbelow v. Northern Pro-
pane Gas Co., 308 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. 1983).
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ney selected by the client and that the third party, the innocent,
should not have to bear any burden in the situation.14 8
Other than Georgia courts, very few courts have applied the appar-
ent authority doctrine to the settlement context and found it to ex-
ist.149 Often, courts state that apparent authority is possible but do
not find that it exists on the basis of the facts. 150
Some courts' views on authority are evidenced not so much by what
they say about authority but rather by where they place the burden of
proof. For example, in Sharick v. Southeastern University of the
Health Sciences, Inc. ,151 the court required "clear and unequivocal au-
thority."152 Such a statement may or may not limit recognized au-
thority to express actual authority. The court further required,
however, that the party claiming the existence of the attorney's au-
thority shoulder the burden of proof.'15 3 In contrast, other courts may
require "express authority" but presume that such authority exists
and require the client to disprove the authority.154
C. Variation from Agency Principles
Courts have taken many approaches to the question of attorney
authority to settle a client's matter. Clearly, some of these approaches
do not apply traditional agency principles in the traditional manner.
148. Speed v. Muhanna, 619 S.E.2d at 329 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting White v. Orr
Leasing, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga. 1993)).
149. But see Rosenblum v. Jacks or Better of America W. Inc., 745 S.W.2d 754, 763
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (finding apparent authority where the attorney had previ-
ously acted as the "exclusive negotiator in the settlement process" and had ac-
cepting portions of the settlement offers and rejecting others).
150. See, e.g., Auvil v. Grafton Homes, Inc., 92 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding no
apparent authority where the attorney negotiated settlement, met with the cli-
ents and returned to opposing counsel stating that the clients had agreed; no
apparent authority); Makins v. District of Columbia, 861 A.2d 590 (D.C. 2004)
(finding that sending attorney to a court-ordered settlement conference and per-
mitting the attorney to negotiate settlement were insufficient acts to establish
apparent authority).
151. 891 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
152. Id. at 565.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Harris v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep't, 437 F.3d 749, 750-51
(8th Cir. 2006) (burden on the client to disprove authority); Cinelli v. MCS Claim
Servs., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (presumption of authority). See also
In re Kollel Mateh Efraim, L.L.C., 334 B.R. 554, 559 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Be-
cause of the unique nature of the attorney-client relationship and the public pol-
icy favoring settlements, an attorney who enters into a settlement, particularly
one on the record in open court, is presumed to have the actual authority to bind
his client... . 'any party challenging an attorney's authority to settle a case under
such circumstances bears the burden of proving by affirmative evidence that the
attorney lacked authority.'" (quoting In re Artha Mgmt., Inc., 91 F.3d 326, 329
(2d Cir. 1996))).
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Why? Why do courts not find the balance of equities struck by tradi-
tional agency rules adequate?
In the context of settlement enforcement, this is an especially in-
teresting query since the courts of the United States have long recog-
nized a public policy in favor of private settlement.15 5 Courts in the
United States are very much in favor of encouraging parties to dis-
putes to reach resolution of their matters. This policy is based on the
notion that private settlements lead to a more efficient court sys-
tem 156 and reduce the overall negative impact on the participants.157
Private resolution of disputes also allows the parties to craft a resolu-
tion that best fits their needs and desires.158
With such a well-recognized policy in place, one would expect that
courts would be inclined to find settlement agreements enforceable.
Yet, as discussed above, many courts are extremely wary of enforcing
settlement agreements entered into by an attorney when the client
claims the attorney lacked the authority to settle. For some courts,
this wariness takes the form of rejection of traditional agency law.
For example, a court may refuse to recognize apparent authority in
this context. Agency doctrine has withstood the test of time as strik-
ing the appropriate balance among the parties and interests in varied
contexts. Yet, some courts do not accept this balance when the ques-
tion is the authority of an attorney-agent to bind a client to a settle-
ment agreement.
As is the case in the tort responsibility context, such a stance
seems to emanate from a desire to protect the client over all others.
The concept of apparent authority recognizes the interest of the inno-
cent third party who is reasonably misled by the client's actions as
superior to the interest of the client-principal. The client selects the
attorney-agent while the innocent third party has no such involve-
ment. Even so, the apparent authority doctrine lends protections to
the third party only if the principal, the client, takes action that leads
155. See St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650, 656
(1898) ("[Slettlements of matters in litigation, or in dispute, without recourse to
litigation, are generally favored."). See also Keahole Def. Coal., Inc. v. Board of
Land & Natural Res., 134 P.3d 585, 605 (Haw. 2006) ("[Tlhis court has acknowl-
edged the strong public policy in favor of settlement of claims.").
156. See Long Term Mgmt, Inc. v. Univ. Nursing Care Ctr., Inc., 704 So. 2d 669, 673
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that settlements are favored as a means to
conserve judicial resources).
157. See Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that
successful settlements avoid the expense and delay incidental to litigation). See
also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J.
2619, 2621 (1995) ("Lawsuits are expensive, terrifying, frustrating, infuriating,
humiliating, time-consuming.").
158. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485, 502 (1985) (noting that
parties are more likely to abide by agreements they make themselves).
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the third party to reasonably believe that the attorney-agent has au-
thority to bind the client. Each court can evaluate whether, on the
particular facts, the client-principal has done enough to be justifiably
bound. Courts applying more limited agency theory elevate protection
of the client over all other interests even though the client chooses the
attorney-agent. Logically, this choice should make the client responsi-
ble for that agent.
V. CLIENT RESPONSBILITY FOR ATTORNEY WAIVER OF
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Another area in which some courts, though not the majority, do not
apply the traditional agency model is the treatment of the issue of
waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
A. The Parameters of the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects from compelled disclosure
communications intended to be confidential between attorney and cli-
ent. The communications must be made for the purpose of obtaining
or rendering legal advice and not made for the purpose of committing
a crime or fraud.159 The attorney-client privilege, unlike its weaker
159. An oft-quoted definition of the privilege is one crafted in 1950 by Judge Wyzanski
in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950):
The privilege applies only if
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made
(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed
(a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either
(i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and
(4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and
(b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59. See also 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAw § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton Rev. 1961); RLGL, supra note 6, § 68 (discuss-
ing coverage of the attorney-client privilege); In re Syncor ERISA Litigation, 229
F.R.D. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("The attorney-client privilege may be divided
into eight essential elements: '(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2)
from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal ad-
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cousin, the work product doctrine, 160 is an absolute protection-if it
applies. No matter the cost or need for the protected information, the
privilege prevents disclosure. 16 1 A creature of Anglo-Saxon law for
many centuries,162 as well as existing in other legal frameworks,
1 6 3 it
is the oldest of the privileges that continues to exist. 16 4 The privilege
creates an environment encouraging free discussion and disclosure be-
tween the attorney and the client so that the attorney can render, and
the client can receive, the best and most appropriate legal advice for
the situation. The client can "bare all" to the attorney with no fear
that the communication will become available to the opposing
party.16 5 Ultimately, the lawyer must have full disclosure to ade-
viser, (8) unless the protection be waived.'" (quoting In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion, 974 F.2d 1068, 1071 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992))).
160. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (disclosure determined by a balance of need for protec-
tion and need for the evidence). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)
(genesis of the work product doctrine).
161. See, e.g., St. Luke Hosp., Inc. v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771, 776-777 (Ky. 2005)
("[WIhen a communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege it may not
be overcome by a showing of need.").
162. See, e.g., Berd v. Lovelace, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (1577). See also PAUL R. RICE, ATTOR-
NEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:2, at 6-8 (2d. ed. 1999) (giving
an in-depth history of the attorney-client privilege); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A
Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061
(1978) (same). The privilege has bases in Roman law and canon law. See CHRIS-
TOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 181, at 302
(2d ed. 1994); Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communications Between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928).
All United States jurisdictions have an attorney-client privilege approximat-
ing the definitions noted here. In many jurisdictions the privilege is a creature of
common law while in some jurisdictions it is codified. See, e.g., ALA. RULE OF
EVID. 502; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (2006); KENTUCKY RULE OF EVID. 503. The
federal privilege is a creature of the common law. See Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
163. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: Ev-
IDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.2.4 (2002).
164. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 181, at 302; WIGMORE, supra note
159, § 2290, at 542. See also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403
(1998) ("The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for
confidential communications."); Frease v. Glazer, 4 P.3d 56, 60 (Or. 2000) ("The
attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest and most widely recognized eviden-
tiary privileges.").
165. In Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980), the Supreme Court stated:
"The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to
know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the pro-
fessional mission is to be carried out." Id. at 51. Annesley v. Anglesea, a case
decided in 1743 which makes the same point, states:
No man can conduct any of his affairs which relate to matters of law,
without employing and consulting with an attorney; even if he is capable
of doing it in point of skill, the law will not let him; and if he does not
fully and candidly disclose every thing that is in his mind, which he ap-
prehends may be in the least relative to the affair he consults his attor-
ney upon, it will be impossible for the attorney properly to serve him.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:346
quately counsel the client so that the client may remain within the
bounds of the law. This preventive effect of the privilege creates socie-
tal benefits because this effect encourages legitimate conduct and dis-
courages conduct contrary to law. 166 Modern day courts frequently
espouse this instrumental rationale of the attorney-client privilege.167
Commentators have noted other, more humanistic rationales. 16s
The cost of such nondisclosure, however, is that the entire story
may not come before the court, thwarting the court's truth-discovering
function. Society has long accepted that cost as reasonable in light of
the believed benefits it creates by enhancing the attorney-client rela-
tionship.169 Yet, the privilege's perceived tendency to hide evidence
17 How. St. Tr. 1137, 1239 (1743) See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n
v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("[Tlhe attorney-client privilege serves the
function of promoting full and frank communications between attorneys and
their clients. It thereby encourages observance of the law and aids in the admin-
istration of justice."). See generally JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON Evi-
DENCE § 72, at 299 (5th ed. 1999); IMWINKELRIED, supra note 163, § 6.2.4;
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 181, at 302-03; WIGMORE, supra note
159, § 2291, at 545-54.
Other justifications, such as protection of the privacy interest of the client in
any communication and the autonomy of the client, have not been relied upon by
courts but have been discussed in commentary. See 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5472, at
77-79(1986); Albert W. Altschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences:
One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 343,
350 (1981).
166. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state, in part, with regard to the general
ethical duty to maintain client confidences, the following:
The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to commu-
nicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or le-
gally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to
represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to
refrain from wrongful conduct. Almost without exception, clients come to
lawyers in order to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of
laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experi-
ence, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and
the law is upheld.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2006).
167. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 181, at 302 ("prevailing modern
rationale"). See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("The pur-
pose of the privilege is 'to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attor-
neys.'"); United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 618 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
("The privilege promotes "sound legal advocacy by ensuring that the counselor
knows all the information necessary to represent his client.").
168. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 163, § 6.2.4; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
162, § 181, at 302-03: See also Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of
the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and
Outside Attorneys Representing Corporations, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1169, 1175-82
(1997). (discussing rationales and criticisms of rationales).
169. See Maldonado v. New Jersey ex rel. Admin. Office of Courts-Prob. Div., 225
F.R.D. 120, 128 (D.N.J. 2004) (stating the privilege "obstructs the search for
truth"). See also STRONG, supra note 165, § 72, at 299 (Discussing privileges, the
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causes courts to scrutinize the privilege's applicability and to apply
the privilege narrowly.170
B. The Privilege is the Client's Privilege
The privilege is the client's, so the client has the power to assert
the privilege or to waive it.171 This statement clarifies that the attor-
ney does not have an independent privilege regarding the communica-
tion even though the attorney is a party to it. Thus, when litigation
arises, and when the opposing party requests production of the earlier
communication with counsel, the client may refuse to disclose the
communication by asserting that the attorney-client privilege protects
the communication from disclosure.
C. Authority to Assert the Privilege
1. Agency
Within the context of asserting or waiving the attorney-client priv-
ilege, agency law would instruct that the client could specifically di-
rect the attorney-agent to assert or waive the privilege and give the
attorney express and specific authority to so act. In addition, the cli-
ent could give the attorney actual authority by implication. For exam-
ple, a court might logically conclude that a client-principal gave the
attorney-agent the implied authority to act regarding the privilege by
employing the attorney to handle a litigation matter. Finally, as to
third parties, the attorney-agent may have apparent authority to
waive the attorney-client privilege if the client-principal took action
that led the third party to believe, reasonably, that the attorney-agent
had the authority to act for the client regarding the privilege.
Courts recognize the authority of attorneys, as agents of clients, to
assert the attorney-client privilege. The United States Supreme
court stated, "Their effect instead is clearly inhibitive; rather than facilitating the
illumination of truth, they shut out the light."); WIGMORE, supra note 159, § 2291,
at 554 ("It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonethe-
less an obstacle to the investigation of the truth."); Louis Kaplow & Stephen
Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and
Social Desirability, 102 HARv. L. REV. 565 (1989) (questioning the benefit of the
privilege in light of its cost).
170. See Ross v. City of Memphis, 423 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 2005) ("The attorney-
client privilege is 'narrowly construed because it reduces the amount of informa-
tion discoverable during the course of a lawsuit.'" (quoting United States v. Col-
lis, 128 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 1997))).
171. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 163, § 6.5.1, at 535; RICE, supra note 162, § 9:1, at
5. See also KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909, 918 (9th Cir. 1987)
("[Tihe client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege."); First Union Nat'l
Bank of Del. v. Maenle, 833 N.E.2d 1279, 1286 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). ("Thus, the
privilege belongs to the client . . .")
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Court, in Fisher v. United States,172 noted that a "universally ac-
cepted" tenet was that an attorney representing a client may assert
the attorney-client privilege. 17 3
2. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct ("MRPC") are consistent with recognition of the attorney's right
to assert the attorney-client privilege.174 Rule 1.6 of the MRPC states
that the lawyer "shall not reveal information relating to the represen-
tation of the client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclo-
sure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation"
or the disclosure fits within several very specific exceptions to the
rule.175 In addition, the comments to Rule 1.6, addressing an order by
the court or tribunal to reveal confidential information, states: "Ab-
sent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should
assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is
not authorized by other law or that the information sought is pro-
tected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other ap-
plicable law."176 Thus, absent any evidence to the contrary in a
particular case, courts accept that attorneys have actual implied au-
thority to assert the privilege even when the client has not expressly
instructed the attorney to assert the privilege.17 7
172. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
173. Id. at 402 n.8. See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 165, § 5500, at 489 ("law-
yer's authority to claim the privilege is universally recognized"); Swidler & Berlin
v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998) ("It has been generally.., accepted...
that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client . . . ."); Frease v.
Glazer, 4 P.3d 56, 60 (Or. 2000) ("[Tjhe client's attorney may claim the privilege
on the client's behalf.").
174. See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 833, 863 (1956) ("[T]he attorney has the duty, upon any attempt to require
him to testify or produce documents within the confidence, to make assertion of
the privilege, not merely for the benefit of the client, but also as a matter of pro-
fessional responsibility in preventing the policy of the law from being violated.").
175. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006).
176. See id. R. 1.6 cmt. 13.
177. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 162, § 200, at 381. In Republic Gear Co.
v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967), the court stated:
Appellant would conclude from this that an attorney may not claim the
privilege where, as here, the client is not present. Such a conclusion ob-
viously misconceives the federal rule. Language as that quoted above
merely emphasizes that, as at common law, the "privilege is the client's,
not the attorney's." 8 Wigmore, Evidence, 2321, p. 629 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961), in the sense that an attorney can neither invoke the privilege
for his own benefit when his client desires to waive it nor waive the priv-
ilege without his client's consent to the waiver. Not only may an attorney
invoke the privilege in his client's behalf when the client is not a party to
the proceeding in which disclosure is sought .... but he should do so, for
he is "duty-bound to raise the claim in any proceeding in order to protect
communications made in confidence."
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3. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
Section 86 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law-
yers ("RLGL") deals with this issue by requiring the attorney to invoke
the privilege "when doing so appears reasonably appropriate, unless
the client: (i) has waived the privilege; or (ii) has authorized the law-
yer or agent to waive it."178 The Reporter's Notes to the RLGL state
that the lawyer at the time of the creation of the communication "is
presumed to have authority to claim the privilege" on behalf of the
client.179 If the client's current litigation counsel disagrees with for-
mer counsel, the current attorney handling the litigation "determines
whether to assert or waive the privilege."1so The RLGL reinforces the
position that the attorney has a duty to assert the attorney-client priv-
ilege. Section 60(b) states: "[tihe lawyer must take steps reasonable in
the circumstances to protect confidential client information against
impermissible use or disclosure."1s1 A comment to section 60 ex-
plains: "The duty to safeguard entails the corollary duties to provide
adequate supervision of nonlawyer personnel ... and to assert privi-
leges and other legal protection applicable to confidential client infor-
mation such as the attorney-client privilege ... and the work product
immunity."1 8 2 A comment to section 27 states the following: "By re-
taining a lawyer, a client implies that the lawyer is authorized to act
for the client in matters relating to the representation and reasonably
appropriate in the circumstances to carry it out."183 This statement
more generally supports the notion of attorney authority to assert the
privilege.
4. Agency and the Recognition of Client Rights are Consistent
Recognizing the authority of the agent to assert the privilege in no
way contradicts the client's ownership of the privilege right. The cli-
ent holds the right but, as with any other agent, may grant an agent
authority to act to affect that right either expressly or by implication.
The legal system accepts that the client-principal grants that author-
ity by implication to the attorney with whom the client is speaking
when creating the privileged communication. In addition, the client-
principal grants that authority by implication to the attorney han-
381 F. 2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967) (citations omitted).
178. RLGL, supra note 6, § 86(1)(b).
179. Id. § 86 Reporter's Note to cmt. b.
180. Id. § 86 Reporter's Note to cmt. c. See also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 165, at
§ 5500, at 492 (stating that litigation attorney's decision controls over any judg-
ment of prior counsel); United States v. DeLillo, 448 F. Supp. 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
("[I]f the former and present attorneys differ ... the current attorney's position
should be followed.").
181. RLGL, supra note 6, § 60(b).
182. Id. § 60 cmt. a.
183. Id. § 27 cmt. c.
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dling the matter in which the question of disclosure of the privileged
communication arises by employing the attorney to handle that mat-
ter. Similarly, corporate officers act as agents in asserting the privi-
lege on behalf of the principal, the corporation.184 The application of
agency concepts to the privilege assertion is simply a recognition of
the fact that the client is the holder of the privilege and, as holder, has
many rights, including the right to grant an attorney the authority to
assert it.
D. Authority to Waive
1. Agency
If a communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege,
that privilege may be waived and, thus, its protection lost. Since the
privilege belongs to the client, the privilege is the client's to waive.
Given the usual conduct of litigation and the role of the attorney and
client in that litigation sphere, the attorney's words or conduct, in the
majority of situations, is the basis for most waiver claims. The ques-
tion that arises, then, is whether the attorney may waive the privilege
on behalf of the client.
As an initial matter, basic agency principles make clear that a cli-
ent certainly should be able to expressly instruct the attorney to waive
the privilege. The client has the right to waive, and, of course, the
client may expressly authorize the attorney to waive on behalf of the
client. To hold otherwise is to deny the application of well-accepted
agency law and to deny a client rights other principals hold. Yet, occa-
sionally, courts make statements that seem to limit the client's ability
to expressly authorize an attorney to waive the privilege. For exam-
ple, the court in Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced
184. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348
(1985) ("The parties in this case agree that, for solvent corporations, the power to
waive the corporate attorney-client privilege rests with the corporation's manage-
ment and is normally exercised by its officers and directors.").
In American Steamship Owners Mutual Protection & Indemnity Ass'n, Inc. v.
Alcoa Steamship Co, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), the court states:
As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through its agents. A
corporation cannot speak directly to its lawyers. Similarly, it cannot di-
rectly waive the privilege when disclosure is in its best interest. Each of
these actions must necessarily be undertaken by individuals empowered
to act on behalf of the corporation .... Thus, for a solvent corporation,
corporate management, acting through its officers and directors, has the
authority to exercise the privilege, a power that must be exercised con-
sistent with management's fiduciary duties.
Id. at 196 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343, 348 (1985)) (citation omitted). See also Wrench L.L.C. v. Taco Bell Corp., 212
F.R.D. 514, 517 (W.D. Mich. 2002) ("In general, the privilege belongs to the corpo-
ration and may be asserted or waived only by those with authority to do so-
typically the officers and directors.").
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Plastics, Inc.,18 5 stated: "While an attorney may assert the privilege
on the client's behalf, . .. only the client may waive the privilege."1 8 6
One possible explanation for the broad statement is that the court
is simply saying that the client, as opposed to the communicating law-
yer, has the right and authority to waive.18 7 With this view, the court
is not speaking to or limiting in any way the litigation attorney as
agent; the client could authorize a waiver by the attorney. However,
the broad statement appears to apply not only to the communicating
lawyer but also to the lawyer representing the client in litigation after
the creation of the protected communication.
Basic agency principles also would allow a client to impliedly au-
thorize an attorney to waive the attorney-client privilege. The only
question is whether the client has in fact impliedly authorized the at-
torney to waive the privilege. Most courts seem to accept that an at-
torney is acting with implied authority, or at least apparent authority,
to waive the privilege when the attorney fails to object to a disclosure,
knowingly discloses a communication known to be privileged, know-
ingly discloses a communication the attorney wrongly believes to be
not privileged, or inadvertently discloses a clearly privileged commu-
nication.18 8 Even if the attorney does not have actual authority, it is
possible that the attorney has apparent authority to waive the privi-
lege if a reasonable third party would think the attorney was acting
with authority when the waiver occurs.
2. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers ("RLGL")
endorses the application of traditional agency principles to the waiver
situation. In Section 61, the RLGL clarifies that a lawyer may dis-
close confidential information "when the lawyer reasonably believes
that doing so will advance the interest of the client in the representa-
tion."1s 9 In an explanatory comment, the RLGL notes that the attor-
ney has "general authority" to take such steps and that "[n]o explicit
185. 227 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
186. Id. at 390 (citation omitted).
187. This was, in fact, the setting of the alleged waiver in Martin Marietta Materials,
Inc. v. Bedford Reinforced Plastics, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 2005).
188. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 9.16, at 9-65 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp.).
[T]hird parties may generally assume that a disclosure made by a lawyer
is authorized by the client, even if that is not the case. For example, if a
lawyer discloses information that would have been protected by the at-
torney-client privilege, the law generally assumes that the client-who
controls the privilege has waived it by authorizing the lawyer to do so as
the client's agent.
Id. See also infra section V.D.3.
189. RLGL, supra note 6, § 61.
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request or grant of permission is required."19o Section 78 of the RLGL
provides that the privilege is waived if the client, the client's attorney,
or any other agent of the client:
(1) agrees to waive the privilege,
(2) disclaims protection of the privilege and
(a) another person reasonably relies on the disclaimer to that person's
detriment; or
(b) reasons of judicial administration require that the client not be per-
mitted to revoke the disclaimer; or
(3) in a proceeding before a tribunal, fails to object properly to an attempt by
another person to give or exact testimony or other evidence of a privileged
communication. 19 1
Further, section 79 of the RLGL states that the privilege is waived
if the client, the client's attorney, or any other agent "voluntarily dis-
closes" the communication. 19 2 The comments to section 79 note that
the section flows from the general idea that "[a] lawyer generally has
implied authority to disclose confidential client communications in the
course of representing a client."193 Further, the attorney's apparent
authority would exist even though the attorney may have acted with-
out client consultation.194 A reasonable third party would think the
attorney was acting on behalf of the client. 195 Indeed, the client may
have specifically instructed the attorney not to disclose a communica-
tion, so the attorney would not have actual authority. In such a situa-
tion, the attorney may have apparent authority as long as the third
party dealing with the attorney does not know of any limitation. Fi-
nally, section 86 states that the client may act to invoke or waive the
privilege "personally or through counsel or another authorized
agent."19 6
3. Most Courts' Holdings Are Consistent with Agency Principles
In modern times, the question of waiver of the privilege often
arises in situations in which attorneys produce protected communica-
tions without realizing that they are doing so. In these inadvertent
disclosure settings, the attorney discloses the privileged document as
the result of all sorts of activities, most of which could be classified as
190. Id. § 61 cmt. b.
191. Id. § 78.
192. Id. § 79.
193. Id. § 79 cmt. c.
194. Id.
195. See also RLGL, supra note 6, § 27 (A lawyer has apparent authority if a "third
person reasonably assumes that the lawyer is authorized to do the act.").
196. Id. § 86. See Hollingsworth v. Time Warner Cable, 812 N.E.2d 976, 991 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2004) ("[Clorporate executives and managers, if endowed with appropriate
authority by their employer, may on behalf of the corporation either assert or
waive the attorney-client privilege." (quoting Shaffer v. OhioHealth Corp., 2004
WL 35725 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004))).
2007] CLIENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYER CONDUCT 387
varying degrees of negligence. Often, the privileged document simply
becomes confused with unprivileged documents, and the lawyer's staff
produces it to opposing counsel.19 7
In this inadvertent disclosure context, many courts determine
whether the disclosure waives the privilege by looking at factors such
as the precautions taken by the disclosing attorney, the extent of the
disclosure in terms of amount of privileged material, the value of the
material to the litigation, the measures taken to rectify the disclosure,
the promptness with which the discloser acted to rectify, and whether
justice would be served by finding no waiver.19 8 For these courts, dis-
closure is not dispositive. A communication can be disclosed and still
be privileged. This approach is consistent with agency law in that the
courts are accepting that the attorney disclosing the protected commu-
nication, if the attorney is the discloser, had implied authority or at
least apparent authority to so act.
This approach is also consistent with several proposed and recent
amendments to federal rules. Proposed Rule 502 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence provides that there is no waiver of the attorney-client priv-
ilege as the result of an inadvertent disclosure if the disclosure oc-
curred in the context of a federal administrative procedure or a federal
litigation matter and if the holder "took reasonable precautions to pre-
vent disclosure and took reasonably prompt measures once the holder
knew or should have known of the disclosure, to rectify the error."199
In addition, the proposed rule makes any agreement concerning the
effect of the disclosure binding on the parties. 20 0 The agreement can
bind third parties only if the agreement becomes a part of a court
order.2O1
197. The issue of inadvertent disclosure has been a frequent topic of law review arti-
cles. See, e.g., Roberta Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis of a Conse-
quence of Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 465 (1993); Richard Marcus, The Perils of Privi-
lege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MIcH L. REV. 1605 (1986); Audrey Rogers, New
Insights on Waiver and the Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Materials: Attor-
ney Responsibility as the Governing Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV. 159 (1995).
198. See, e.g., United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 233 F.R.D.
483 (N.D. Miss. 2006) (utilizing a factor approach to find no waiver of privilege for
documents inadvertently disclosed); Atronic Int'l, GMBH v. SAI Semispecialists
of America, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (utilizing a factor approach to
find a waiver of privilege on carelessness grounds where emails were inadver-
tently produced under Rule 26 and again at a deposition); Universal City Dev.
Partners, Ltd. v. Ride & Show Eng'g, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 688 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (utiliz-
ing a factor approach to find that privilege had been waived). See also RLGL,
supra note 6, § 79 cmt. h (discussing inadvertent disclosure).
199. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 502(b) (May 15, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/ReportsEV05-2006.pdf.
200. See id. 502(e).
201. See id. 502 (d); id. 502(e).
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Recent changes to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
also allow agreements not to waive. The revised rule further provides
that a party may assert the privilege with regard to already disclosed
communications and the other party "must promptly return, seques-
ter, or destroy the specified information" and copies of it.202
Some courts take the position that any disclosure is a waiver in the
inadvertent disclosure setting. No privilege exists regardless of how
the disclosure occurs. 20 3 For example, in the context of a patent dis-
pute, one court stated that inadvertent "disclosure of documents sub-
ject to an attorney-client privilege operates as a waiver."204 The court
noted that "[m]istake or inadvertence is, after all, merely a euphe-
mism for negligence, and, certainly.., one is expected to pay a price
for one's negligence." 20 5 Courts in contexts other than patents hold
the same view.206 This absolute approach is consistent with agency
law as the courts applying the approach accept that an attorney dis-
closing protected communications has implied authority, or at least
apparent authority, to do so.
Courts recognize an attorney's authority to waive the privilege in
settings other than inadvertent disclosure. For example, courts often
find a failure to properly document assertion of the privilege on a priv-
ilege log to constitute a waiver. 20 7 Privilege logs are almost always
created by the attorney or the attorney's staff. Also, courts often find
202. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(5)(B). See generally Ronald J. Hedges, A View From the
Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123 (2005); Laura Catherine
Daniel, Note, The Dubious Origins and Dangers of Clawback and Quick-Peek
Agreements: An Argument Against their Codification in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 663 (2005).
203. See, e.g., Minebea Co. v. Papst, 228 F.R.D. 34, 35 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[If a client
wished to preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidentiality of attorney-cli-
ent communications like jewels-if not crown jewels." (quoting In re Sealed Case,
877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989))); Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int'l B.V., 160
F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Mass. 1994) ("In this district, disclosure of documents subject to an
attorney client privilege operates as a waiver to any documents disclosed by inad-
vertence." (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digi-
tal Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988))); Wichita Land & Cattle
Co. v. American Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 148 F.R.D. 456, 457 (D.D.C. 1992) ("Disclo-
sure of otherwise-privileged materials, even where the disclosure was inadver-
tent, serves as a waiver of the privilege."); F.D.I.C. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253
(D. Me. 1992) ("[Wlhen a document is disclosed, even inadvertently, it is no longer
held in confidence despite the intentions of the party and thus, 'the privilege is
lost . . . .'" (quoting In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).
204. Ares-Serono, Inc v. Organon Int'l B.V., 160 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. Mass. 1994).
205. Id. (quoting Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450
(D. Mass. 1988)).
206. See, e.g., Singh, 140 F.R.D. at 253.
207. See, e.g., Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 476 (E.D.
Pa. 2005) (failing to identify the author of a document on the privilege log is
waiver).
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the attorney's failure to assert the privilege or object to disclosure of a
privileged communication to be waiver. 2 08
However, courts recognizing an attorney's authority to waive the
privilege usually do not expressly address the issue. Rather, the au-
thority is implicitly assumed. One case in which the court expressly
dealt with the authority issue is In re Grand Jury Investigations of
Ocean Transportation. 20 9 The court evaluated two claims of privilege
for documents that an attorney had produced in response to a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum. Unlike the traditional inadvertent disclo-
sure setting in which the attorney recognizes the document as privi-
leged but produces it by mistake, the attorney in Ocean Transport
intended to produce a set of documents because the attorney believed
the documents to be unprivileged. Several months later the privilege
was asserted. 2 10 The second claim to privilege in Ocean Transport re-
lated to a set of documents produced but marked with a "P." When
opposing counsel inquired about the documents with the "P," he was
assured that the documents were not privileged. Later, the privilege
was asserted. The court deemed the privilege waived for both sets of
documents. 2 11 The court noted that the client had, in general, in-
structed the attorney not to produce any documents protected by the
privilege. 2 12 The court stated that the attorneythen acted as the cli-
ent's agent in determining what to disclose. 2 13
In contrast, there are other situations where the attorney is clearly
not acting as an agent of the client. Yet, the finding that an agency
did not exist is consistent with agency doctrine. This situation exists
when the attorney discloses, not to further the interests of the client in
the attorney's role as a representative of the client, but rather to sat-
isfy ethical responsibilities. For example, in Newman v. State,2 14 the
attorney disclosed communications with his client as permitted by the
applicable ethics rule. The rule allowed disclosure of information if
the attorney believed such disclosure was reasonably necessary "to
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that
the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily
208. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1408-09
(S.D. Cal. 1994) (failing to place the document on a privilege log operates as a
waiver); Banks v. Office of Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, 233 F.R.D. 1, 9 (D.D.C.
2005) (failing to assert privilege until after the privilege log was submitted re-
sulted in waiver).
209. 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nomn. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United
States, 444 U.S. 915 (1979).
210. Id. at 674.
211. Id. at 675.
212. Id. at 674.
213. Id. at 675. See also United States v. Martin, 773 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1985) (attor-
ney acted within the scope of this authority in making statements to the IRS on
his client's behalf).
214. 863 A.2d 321 (Md. 2004).
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harm."2 15 The attorney reported the client had discussed killing her
children. The Court refused to find that the privilege had been de-
feated by the disclosure because the attorney was not acting as the
agent of the client in making the disclosure. 2 16 Such a holding is con-
sistent with agency principles even though the Court recognized no
agency.
4. Some Courts Do Not Apply Traditional Agency Concepts
A few courts, however, take the position that an inadvertent disclo-
sure by an attorney cannot be a waiver. 2 17 For example, in Premier
Digital Access, Inc. v. Central Telephone Company,2 1 8 the United
States District Court for the District of Nevada evaluated whether a
privileged communication (an email), which was disclosed during doc-
ument production, retained the protection of the privilege. The email
was from an in-house attorney to the client, and it offered advice
about a contract. In the subsequent litigation, litigation counsel pro-
duced 1280 pages of documents, including the email, as its initial dis-
closure pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The client discovered the disclosure a year later when the opposition
mentioned it in a response to a motion for summary judgment. The
client claimed that it was an inadvertent disclosure by litigation coun-
sel.2 1 9 The court refused to find a waiver on the basis of the inadver-
tent disclosure, stating: "[W]aiver of the privilege may only occur due
to a voluntary disclosure, and that disclosure must be made by the
215. Id. at 332 (quoting MD. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)).
216. Id. at 333. The Newman court noted that to allow the attorney to destroy the
privilege without consent of the client would do much damage to the privilege.
Id. Note that in this scenario the attorney is not acting as the attorney for the
client and so cannot be said to have implied authority to make the disclosure. See
also Purcell v. Dist. Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997)
(finding that privilege was not defeated even though attorney revealed privileged
communications to warn of an arson threat).
217. See, e.g., KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1987) (regarding
inadvertent disclosure during discovery, the client is the holder of the privilege
and the holder did not voluntarily disclose the document); Premier Digital Ac-
cess, Inc. v. Cent. Tele. Co., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Nev. 2005) (requiring volun-
tary disclosure by the client for waiver); 46th Cir. Trial Court v. Crawford
County, 702 N.W.2d 588 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd on other grounds, 719
N.W.2d 553 (Mich. 2006) (noting that there can be no waiver based on an inad-
vertent disclosure because waiver must be intentional); Georgetown Manor, Inc.
v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that an inadver-
tent disclosure by an attorney does not constitute a waiver); Helman v. Murry's
Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Del. 1990) (inadvertent disclosure by counsel
does not waive privilege); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (inadvertent disclosure by the attorney cannot be waiver).
218. 360 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Nev. 2005).
219. Id. at 1171.
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client." 220 Interestingly, in reaching its result, the court relied on a
Nevada state court opinion, Manley v. State,2 2 1 in which the Court
also stated that "the attorney may claim the privilege on the client's
behalf, [but] only the client has the ability to waive it."222 Thus, these
courts reject the notion that the attorney is impliedly authorized to act
for the client in the litigation role. In addition, these courts appear to
reject the notion that the attorney may have apparent authority to act
for the client.223
The rationale of some of these cases seems tied to an erroneous
view of the standard for waiver of the privilege. In Mendenhall v. Bar-
ber-Greene Co. ,224 a case of inadvertent production by an attorney, the
court found no waiver because it believed a waiver required an "'inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."' 2 25 The
Mendenhall court recognized that the standard was one for constitu-
tional rights but stated that it applied to the attorney-client privilege
as well. The Mendenhall court concluded: "If we are serious about the
attorney-client privilege and its relation to the client's welfare, we
should require more than such negligence by counsel before the client
can be deemed to have given up the privilege."22 6
The generally accepted position on the standard of required mental
state is that waiver of the attorney-client privilege is an event of lesser
moment than a waiver of constitutional rights. The waiver must be
voluntary but not necessarily intentional and knowing.22 7 The RLGL
states: "To constitute waiver, a disclosure must be voluntary. The dis-
closing person need not be aware that the communication was privi-
220. Id. at 1174.
221. 979 P.2d 703 (Nev. 1999).
222. Id. at 707 n.1.
223. In Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990), the
court stated: "The holder of the privilege is the client. It would fly in the face of
the essential purpose of the attorney/client privilege to allow a truly inadvertent
disclosure of a privileged communication by counsel to waive the client's privi-
lege." See also KL Group v. Case, Kay & Lynch, 829 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1987)
(noting that regarding the inadvertent disclosure of documents during discovery;
the client is the holder of the privilege and that the holder did not voluntarily
disclose the documents); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 936 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that there was no waiver of the privilege dur-
ing an inadvertent disclosure by the attorney, where there was no intentional
relinquishment by the client).
224. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
225. Id. at 955 (quoting United States ex rel. Ross v. Franzen, 668 F.2d 933, 941 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
226. 531 F. Supp. at 955 (emphasis omitted).
227. See RICE, supra note 162, § 9.20 at 58 (Attorney-client privilege is not a constitu-
tional right; thus, "the client's intention not to waive will not prevent one's volun-
tary disclosure from effecting a waiver.").
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leged, nor specifically intend to waive the privilege." 228 Judicially
compelled disclosures, for example, would not be voluntary
disclosures. 2 29
Apart from the inadvertent disclosure setting, a few courts have
denied the application of basic agency concepts in other waiver set-
tings. In Compulit v. Banctec, Inc.,230 the court examined whether a
law firm could waive its client's attorney-client privilege by disclosing
privileged information to a litigation support company. The court took
the position that the law firm could not waive the privilege "because it
rests with the client." 23 1 The court did not explore implied authority
or apparent authority.
Perhaps the most intriguing case, however, is Harold Sampson
Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust.2 3 2 In Sampson,
an attorney voluntarily produced documents that were privileged but
that the attorney thought were not privileged. The client did not spe-
cifically consent to the production or even know about it.233 The Wis-
consin Court of Appeals decided that the attorney had waived the
privilege. Under general agency concepts, the appellate court held
discovery compliance was an area the client delegated to the lawyer
and that a waiver of the attorney-client privilege need not be "an in-
tentional relinquishment of a known right."234
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed, stating:
[A] lawyer, without the consent or knowledge of a client, cannot waive the
attorney-client privilege by voluntarily producing privileged documents
(which the attorney does not recognize as privileged) to an opposing attorney
in response to a discovery request. We hold that only the client can waive the
attorney-client privilege under Wis. Stat. § 905.11.235
The Court specifically stated that ordinarily under agency law the
acts of counsel "during the representation" bind the client but held
that reliance on this agency theory was "misplaced" in this situa-
tion.2 3 6 The Court compared the waiver situation to a case in which a
court imputed an attorney's actions in missing deadlines to the client
228. RLGL, supra note 6, § 79 cmt. g. See also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note
162, § 5.28, at 564 (1995) (discussing voluntary disclosure).
229. See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 220 F.R.D. 264, 275 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("It
is clear that a 'judicially compelled' disclosure is not a voluntary one."); Gov't
Guar. Fund of Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 182 F.R.D. 182, 187 (D.V.I.
1998) ("The attorney client privilege is not destroyed by disclosure of protected
information to an outside party which is done only under the compulsion of a
court order.").
230. 177 F.R.D. 410 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
231. Id. at 412.
232. 679 N.W.2d 794 (Wis. 2004).
233. Id. at 795.
234. Id. at 795-96.
235. Id. at 796.
236. Id. at 801.
[Vol. 86:346
2007] CLIENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYER CONDUCT 393
and sanctioned the client. In that situation, in the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court's view, the equities were in favor of imputing the attor-
ney's actions to the client because the client chose the noncomplying
attorney. Holding the client responsible assisted the functioning of
the judicial system. The Court distinguished the waiver situation by
stating that imputation in the privilege situation did not promote the
"functioning of the justice system" while protecting the privilege
did.237 To hold otherwise would place "too heavy a burden on the at-
torney-client relationship if an attorney were allowed to waive the at-
torney-client privilege in cases like the present case."23 8 The Court
stated: "[T]he agency doctrine does not apply to waiver of attorney-
client privilege as it relates to privileged documents." 239
E. The Policies
To hold that an attorney cannot be authorized to waive a client's
attorney-client privilege is to limit the rights and power held by the
client. A typical principal can authorize another to act as an agent of
the principal by express language, by implication, or by apparent au-
thorization. According to some courts, client-principals do not share
these powers. These courts refuse to recognize that the client may
have expressly or impliedly authorized the attorney to waive the privi-
lege and refuse to recognize the application of apparent authority to
the situation. The logical extreme in the context of a corporation seek-
ing to waive the privilege is that the corporation does not have a right
to waive since a corporation can only act through an agent. If the cor-
poration cannot authorize an agent to waive, no waiver is possible. If
a court is willing to allow a corporation to authorize a nonlawyer-
agent to waive, then the court creates the odd situation in which the
corporation could expressly, impliedly or apparently authorize a non-
lawyer-agent but not a lawyer-agent. 240
This minority view seems motivated by a desire to protect the at-
torney-client privilege and a desire to protect the client from the cli-
ent's own chosen attorney. Such motivation is odd. First, courts
traditionally have been wary of the privilege because of its propensity
to shield relevant evidence from the fact-finder. As a result of this
wariness, courts apply the privilege strictly and interpret it nar-
rowly.241 One would expect courts to be inclined to find waiver. Sec-
237. Id. at 802.
238. Harold Sampson Children's Trust v. Linda Gale Sampson 1979 Trust, 679
N.W.2d 794, 802 (Wis. 2004).
239. Id.
240. Professor Paul Rice has noted this oddity. See RIcE, supra note 162, § 9.47, at
253.
241. See Deel v. Bank of America, N.A., 227 F.R.D. 456, 458 (W.D. Va. 2005) ("Because
the attorney-client privilege 'impedes the full and free discovery of the truth, it
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ond, why does the client need protection from the actions of the
attorney chosen by the client? Protecting the client seems odd, espe-
cially since the client selects the attorney and enjoys the protection of
attorney standards of conduct that other principals do not have. Fur-
ther, such a position means that attorneys have less incentive to exer-
cise care with privileged documents.
VI. CONCLUSION
This analysis reveals several meager truths. In the context of cli-
ent responsibility for an attorney's tortious conduct, some courts are
disinclined to apply traditional agency concepts so as to make clients
responsible for attorney torts or to bind the clients to settlements
agreed to by their attorneys. In the context of waiver of the attorney-
client privilege, some courts are wary of applying traditional agency
concepts so that the clients are bound by the attorneys' waivers.
The courts clearly appear to be motivated by desire to protect the
client-principals. Yet, as the above discussion reflects, courts may not
be making decisions with a clear understanding of what traditional
agency law would dictate. In other words, courts motivated by a de-
sire to protect client-principals may not understand that their hold-
ings deviate significantly from traditional agency principles. Thus,
these courts have a less-than-perfect understanding of the costs of ad-
ditional client protection while perhaps having a "rose-colored glasses"
view of the need for client protection.
The effect of providing the added protection to clients is that those
clients are not held responsible for their attorneys' actions. The third
party dealing with the client's attorney-the injured party in the tort
scenario, the opposing party in the settlement context, and the oppos-
ing party and the court in the context of the waiver of the attorney-
client privilege-bears the burden of the attorney's conduct. Tradi-
tional agency law would make client responsibility possible if actual or
apparent authority is present. Traditional agency law would give
weight to the client's responsibility in selecting the attorney. Some
modern courts choose to ignore these established principles. The cli-
ent is protected; the innocent third party is not. The client has no
incentive to exercise care in selecting an attorney and no incentive to
monitor the matter handled by the attorney. There is no disincentive
to the client inclined to encourage inappropriate lawyer conduct. The
deceptive and deceitful client walks away whistling.
must be narrowly construed and recognized only to the very limited extent that
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predom-
inant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.'" (quoting In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 341 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom.
Under Seal v. United States, 541 U.S. 982 (2004) (other internal quotation marks
omitted))).
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This special treatment of attorneys and clients creates confusion as
to the rules of law that apply to the attorney and client relationship.
Attorneys are agents, perhaps, and clients are principals, perhaps.
Even so, rules that apply to other principals and agents may not ap-
ply. As courts render opinions in which attorneys are treated differ-
ently, the law of agency in general becomes less clear.
Such significant negative effects must have redeeming justification
or rationalization. Unfortunately, there is no compelling justification
for setting aside traditional agency rules in the context of the attorney
and client relationship. Client-principals need no special protection
over and above what agency law provides for other principals. As in
any other agency and principal setting, the client-principal is perfectly
capable of choosing an attorney for whatever legal services are re-
quired and consulting with that attorney to achieve the goal. When,
occasionally, matters go awry, the client should be responsible for the
attorney if the customary rules of agency would so dictate. The client-
principal reaps the benefits of the relationship and rightfully must
shoulder the costs and risks. The attorney and client relationship is
simply not so different from other agency relationships as to require
different rules. Any special protection is present in the form of the
rules of ethics governing attorney conduct, principles of fiduciary
duty, and attorney malpractice liability.
